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Summary
The purpose of the study was to compare the Finn-
ish employment and income security models with
the other Nordic countries and to evaluate to what
extent the differences in income security systems
reinforce or even produce the revealed differences
in labour market participation. The differences in
labour market behaviour are analysed on the basis
of statistical material derived from labour market
surveys and official population statistics. The in-
come security systems are compared specifically on
their potential ability to encourage to stay on at work
longer and to reconcile working life with social se-
curity, with special reference to those whose capa-
city or willingness to participate full time is tempor-
arily or permanently reduced (elderly workers, par-
ents of small children, persons with impaired func-
tioning, and others at a disadvantage in the labour
market).
A comparison of employment models focusing on
2002/2003 showed that of the Nordic countries, Fin-
land has the lowest employment rate (67.7%) and
the shortest employed life expectancy (men: 32.5
years; women 31.6 years), but the largest number
of hours worked per employed person (1682 h).
This means that paid work is distributed among a
smaller proportion of the working-age population
and across a narrower range of years of the life time
than in the Nordic countries. In terms of the number
of hours worked, the difference to Sweden and Nor-
way was especially pronounced. There are two prin-
cipal reasons for this: first, part-time work is less
common in Finland than elsewhere in the Nordic
countries (especially among women); and second,
temporary absences are much less common than
in Sweden or Norway.
The statutory social security arrangements of the
other Nordic countries are more supportive of per-
sons disadvantaged in the labour market than is the
case in Finland, principally because of high earn-
ings replacement rates and ceilings on coverage for
earnings losses. In Denmark and Norway, the earn-
ings replacement rate of sickness and parental al-
lowances for low-income persons is 100 percent,
which means that the work absences of employees
at the lower end of the income distribution scale
result in no wage costs for the employers, with the
exception of the initial employer-covered period of
sickness absence. The gross earnings replacement
rate of the allowances is in Finland the lowest in the
Nordic countries, which not only means smaller
allowances for the employees but also imposes a
heavier burden on the employers topping up the
statutory allowance with a collectively bargained
wage component.
The possibility to combine benefits flexibly with
paid employment is built into nearly all of the ben-
efits available in the other Nordic countries. Among
them, at least part-time sickness allowances and
partial disability pensions appear to have a discern-
ible effect on employment. In Finland, part-time
benefits are available on more stringent criteria and
are used little (with the exception of the part-time
pension). The other Nordic countries have addition-
al arrangements for promoting the employment of
the chronically ill and those with impaired func-
tioning, which limit the potential risk to the em-
ployer from hiring functionally impaired persons.
In Finland there are no such regulations for ”high
risk employees”. Among the Nordic countries, Fin-
land is alone in applying experience rating for indi-
vidual employers when it comes to statutory dis-
ability pension provision. The direct costs which this
imposes on the employers are assumed to act as a
disincentive to the hiring of older workers and func-
tionally impaired persons at the same time as they
promote employers’ motivation to take better care
of the health of their employees.
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1  Purpose of the study
In the lively debate on the implementation of the
European Union’s Lisbon Strategy and its overarch-
ing principle to combine economic, labour market
and social policy goals in a mutually reinforcing way,
the Nordic countries are often mentioned as exam-
ples of the workability of the ”European social mod-
el”. The Nordic countries are top performers in
many international surveys which rank countries
according economic development, employment and
competitiveness, even though they have retained
their accustomed high level of income security and
a large selection of public services. In recent times,
Denmark has been a particularly impressive exam-
ple of the compatibility of economic performance
and high social solidarity, whereas Finland has
lagged behind its Nordic neighbours particularly
with respect to the development of total employ-
ment.
In Finland as in most other EU countries, raising
the rate of employment and lengthening work ca-
reers are among top goals for the current decade.
The Finnish Government has set a goal of increas-
ing the employment rate from its current level of
67 percent to 75 percent by the end of the next par-
liamentary period in 2011. The Government is also
seeking to extend average working careers by 2 to 3
years. Attainment of these goals would lift the Finn-
ish employment rate to the level of the other Nor-
dic countries. However, in setting these goals, the
Government took scant notice of the fact that the
structure of employment is markedly different in
Finland than it is in the Scandinavian neighbour
countries. Compared to Swedes and Norwegians,
Finns are more likely to be in full-time employment,
to retire earlier and to end up in long-term unem-
ployment but also have fewer short absences from
work. Taking this into account, is it possible to raise
the employment rate and lengthen working careers
without at the same time adjusting other factors
determining the total labour input, such as the prev-
alence of part-time employment or the social norms
governing sickness and other temporary absences
from work? Here we find that it is useful to exam-
ine Finland and the other Nordic countries com-
paratively to discover to what extent the character-
istics social security systems of the individual coun-
tries may have produced or reinforced the differ-
ences in the employment structures observed be-
tween the Nordic countries.
Comparing Finland with the other Nordic coun-
tries is useful from a broader European perspective
as well. Given the fact that the Nordic countries are
relatively homogenous with regard to their labour
markets and the institutional structure of their so-
cial security systems, analysing the differences that
can be discerned will help to highlight mechanisms
which are universally relevant to understanding the
interaction between labour market and social se-
curity systems. According to common European
objectives, social security is to be reformed to pro-
vide greater support for employment and re-em-
ployment of groups occupying a precarious posi-
tion in today’s labour markets. Key steps involve
strengthening the labour market position of age-
ing, functionally limited or poorly trained workers
and of women struggling to combine work and
starting a family, and supporting their continued
employment. We must also examine social security
more closely from the point of view of fitting it to
the needs of individuals at different stages of life,
including balancing work and family life and pur-
suing life-long learning. In order to promote the
employment and social inclusion of different groups
in society, it is essential to consider the needs of both
parties in the labour market, to make work more
attractive than welfare, and to combine social secur-
ity with flexible work arrangements. (European
Commission 2003a.)
The purpose of this study is to discover how the
employment patterns of Finnish workers differ from
those of their counterparts in the other Nordic
countries, and to examine to what extent the em-
ployment differences can be explained by differences
in the institutional structure of social security. The
starting observation is that in the Nordic countries
nearly all persons of working age are either gainful-
ly employed or in receipt of income security bene-
fits, which themselves are in one way or another
linked with gainful employment. Taking this as our
starting point, the provision of income security ap-
pears as a kind of exercise in optimisation aimed
both at providing security against various livelihood
risks and at maximising participation in gainful
employment through a host of incentives whose
purpose is to promote the supply and demand for
labour. Since the Nordic countries are largely ho-
mogenous in terms of their basic labour market and
social security structures, comparisons between
them can help us to examine the effect of whatever
institutional differences that can be observed.
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The study is comprised of two parts. The first part
looks at labour force participation and the distri-
bution of gainful employment in the working-age
population. The second part begins with a compar-
ison of income security benefit systems and benefit
utilisation rates in the Nordic countries, and moves
on to discuss the differences in utilisation rates in
relation to differences in employment patterns. We
approach the subject from the point of view of the
”institutional logic” of social security systems (cf.
Freeman et al. 1995; Kosonen 1998, 175–181) and
its effect on the labour force participation of the
working-aged population. In describing the social
security systems of the individual countries, we shall
limit ourselves to features relevant to the study prob-
lem. The benefit utilisation rates are compared on
the basis of existing studies and statistical informa-
tion. The legislation is described from the point of
employees and employers, excluding self-employed
persons and those outside the labour market. The
time period covered is in most cases one particular
year at the beginning of the 2000s.
It must be noted that an accurate portrayal of the
labour market and social security models of the in-
dividual Nordic countries would require us to
broaden our attention beyond social security to
encompass taxation and income policies as well.
However, in the present study we shall focus solely
on describing the institutional structures of the ben-
efit systems. Another limitation of our approach that
must be acknowledged is that it takes no account of
the different paths of development taken by the so-
cial security systems of the Nordic countries to reach
their current state of relative homogeneity.
2 Employment in Finland and the other
Nordic countries
2.1  Labour market participation1
Employment and labour force participation
rates
One of the hallmark features of the Nordic model
has been the high employment rate among both
men and women. A comparison of labour force
surveys in the enlarged EU shows all of the Nordic
countries to be placed well. In 2003, Denmark oc-
cupied the top position with an employment rate
of 75.1 percent, while Sweden was third (72.9%) and
Finland seventh (67.7%). At 75.4%, the Norwegian
rate was roughly the same as Denmark’s. Among
the other EU countries, Finland was surpassed by
Austria, Cyprus, Great Britain and the Netherlands.
(Table 2.1.)
Prior to the recession of the early 1990s, Sweden
held the top position among the Nordic countries
with an employment rate of 81.4 percent, while Fin-
land was third with a rate of 74.1 percent, one per-
centage point behind Denmark but one point ahead
of Norway (Statistical Offices of the Nordic coun-
tries).
Figure 2.1 shows that reasons for the difference in
the employment rate between Finland and the other
Nordic countries are primarily found in the employ-
ment rates of the youngest and oldest age groups.
The employment rate of Finnish men diverges from
the rest of the Nordic countries already at the age
of 45 years. By contrast, the employment rate of
Finnish women aged 40–54 is a little higher even
than the corresponding Norwegian rate. One nota-
ble observation is that the employment rate of
Swedish young adults is as low as that of their Finn-
ish counterparts, but the employment rate of Swedes
between the ages 50 and 64 is, for women, the high-
est in the Nordic countries and, for men, equally
high as in Norway. In Denmark, the overall employ-
ment rate is boosted considerably by the exception-
ally high level of employment among young adults.
The employment rate for the older age groups in
Denmark is, for men, approximately the same as in
Sweden and Norway, and for women, approximately
the same as in Finland. The overall employment rate
in Norway is raised by the high rate particularly
among older workers, but also among young adults.
The greatest relative difference between Finland and
the rest of the Nordic countries appears when we
study the labour force participation rate of those
aged 65 or over. No more than 6 percent of Finns
aged 65–69 are gainfully employed, compared with
nearly 20% of Norwegians, 14% of Danes and 13%
of Swedes.
In Finland, the total supply of labour is also signif-
icantly lower than in the other Nordic countries. The
lower employment rate in Finland is, then, only
1 The employment rate refers to the gainfully employed as a percentage share
of the population of the same age. It represents the rates reported in labour
force surveys averaged over several weeks. Included among those gainfully
employed are those who have worked at least one hour or who have been
temporarily absent from work throughout the week. Correspondingly, the la-
bour force participation rate is calculated as a share of population of those in
the labour force (either employed or unemployed).
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Table 2.1. Labour force participation, employment and unemployment rates in the Nordic countries, 2003.
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos.
Figure 2.1. Employment rates in the Nordic countries by 5-year age groups, 2003.
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos.
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  Finland Sweden Norway Denmark 
Labour force participation rate (15–64) 74.4 77.3 77.3 79.4 
     
Employment rate     
     
Both sexes (15–64) 67.7 72.9 75.4 75.1 
Men 69.7 74.2 76.8 79.6 
Women 65.7 71.5 71.2 70.5 
   
55 to 64 year-olds 49.6 68.6 66.7 60.2 
65 to 69 year-olds 5.9 12.7 19.7 14.3 
   
Unemployed as a percentage of the labour force (15–64) 9,0 5,6 4.5 5.6 
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partly attributable to higher unemployment. Sev-
enty-four percent of working-age Finns were in the
labour force, which is 5 percentage points less than
in Denmark and about 3 points less than in Sweden
or Norway. The rate of unemployment, or the share
of the unemployed in the total labour force, was
highest in Finland (9%) and lowest in Norway
(4.5%). (Table 2.1.)
Labour market participation over the life cycle
In the European Union success in meeting the tar-
gets for longer labour market participation over the
life cycle is measured by means of the ”exit age”,
which represents the intensity of labour force with-
drawal among persons aged 50 or over (see Euro-
pean Commission 2002; Scherer 2002). Hytti and
Nio (2004) illustrate the many problems associated
with this method. According to the authors, the fun-
damental principle in the monitoring of the length
of working life should be a description of the length
of the time spent in the labour market in propor-
tion to the life expectancy as a whole. This require-
ment is met by the method used widely in public
health studies, where the total life expectancy is di-
vided into different stages of life in terms of health
and work ability (the so-called Sullivan method).
Table 2.2 shows the results of a calculation using
the Sullivan method of labour force participation
in the Nordic countries in 2002 and compares la-
bour market life expectancies to general life expect-
ancies in each country. The measure depicts the ac-
tive life expectancy of an artificial birth cohort based
on the assumption that the labour force shares,
employment rates and mortality of individual age
groups remain unchanged at the level of the study
year throughout the entire life span of the cohort.
The table presents separately the expected years of
life as a part of the labour force and in employment
at ages 16 and 50.
In table 2.2, the labour force participation expect-
ancy of 16-year-olds represents the length of labour
force participation over the entire life cycle assum-
ing that labour force shares and mortality risks spe-
cific to the year 2002 remain unchanged through-
out the cohort’s life. In Finland, the labour force
participation expectancy of 16-year-old males (35.8
years) is roughly four years shorter than in Norway
or Denmark and about three years shorter than in
Sweden. The gap between Finland and the other
Nordic countries widens further when we look at
expected years in employment. In Finland, males
aged 16 have an expected employment of 32.5 years,
or a little over five years less than in Norway or Den-
mark and about four years less than in Sweden.
Among women, the difference between Finland and
the other Nordic countries in both labour force
participation and employed life expectancy is less
pronounced than it is among men. With a labour
force participation expectancy of 34.8 years and an
expectancy of  employment of 31.6 years, Finnish
women aged 16 are two years behind Norway and
Sweden on labour force participation expectancy
and a little less than four years behind on employed
life expectancy.
The difference between Finland and the rest of the
Nordic countries becomes even more prominent
when we turn our attention to labour market life
expectancies at age 50. Finnish men and women
aged 50 have employed life expectancies of 8.6 years
and 8.4 years, respectively, while in Norway and
Sweden, men’s life expectancy in employment is
more than three years longer and women’s more
than two years longer than in Finland. Denmark has
only a six-month advantage over Finland when it
comes to the employed life expectancy of ageing
women.
Longer life expectancies are often used as an argu-
ment for the need for longer working careers. This
argument assumes that at least some of the gain in
total life expectancy should be allocated to making
working careers longer. Comparisons of the gener-
al life expectancy and active life expectancy in the
individual Nordic countries do not unequivocally
support this argument. The main counterexample
is the case of Danish women, whose life expectancy
at both age 16 and age 50 is about two years shorter
but whose employed life expectancy is longer than
that of Finnish women of the corresponding ages.
In table 2.3, we examine further the contribution
of different age groups to the differences in total
working life expectancy at age 16 in various Nordic
countries. The comparison shows, in the light of
experiences from the Nordic countries, to what ex-
tent it seems to be possible to extend the total length
of working life by raising employment levels at both
ends of the working-age population. The table
shows that the contribution of young Danes to the
expected length of working life is significantly big-
ger than the contribution of young adults in the
other Nordic countries. This is in contrast to Nor-
way, where the expectation of years in employment
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Table 2.2. Labour market and overall life expectancies at ages 16 and 50 in the Nordic countries,  2002/2003.
Sources:
Finland and Sweden: Labour force surveys 2002, life tables 2002.
Norway: The figures for the expectancies of life as part of the labour force and in employment are from 2003, while the overall life
expectancy figures are from 2002.
Denmark: Register-based labour force statistics, 1.1.2002, life table 2001–2002.
Table 2.3. Input of various age-groups into the expected years in employment of 16-year-old males and
females in the Nordic countries  2002/2003.
Table 2.2
 
  Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Expectancy of life as part of the labour force, years    
at age 16     
–    men 35.8 38.5 39.7 39.2
–    women 34.8 36.6 36.8 36.1
     
Expectancy of life in employment, years  
at age 16  
–    men 32.5 36.8 37.9 37.8
–    women 31.6 35.2 35.3 34.6
at age 50  
–    men 8.6 11.9 12.3 11.0
–    women 8.4 10.8 10.9 8.8
   
Overall life expectancy, years  
at age 16  
–    men 59.3 62.2 60.9 59.3
–    women 65.9 66.5 66.0 63.8
at age 50  
–    men 27.7 29.6 28.9 27.3
–    women 33.0 33.4 33.0 31.0
 
Table 2.3
 
Age-group Finland  Sweden Norway Denmark
Males 
Expected employment total 32.5 36.8 37.9 37.8
of which years lived at age      
16–24 3.8 4.1 5.0 6.3
25–49 20.6 21.1 21.0 21.0
50–74 8.1 11.5 11.8 10.5
     
Females 
Expected employment total 31.6 35.2 35.3 34.6
of which years lived at age      
16–24 3.9 4.3 5.0 5.9
25–49 19.4 20.4 19.6 20.2
50–74 8.2 10.6 10.7 8.5
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during the total life time is increased by high em-
ployment levels both in the young and the elderly
populations.
2.2  Differences in the distribution of
labour inputs
Part-time and temporary employment
Part-time and temporary employment is generally
referred to collectively as ”atypical employment”.
However, the EU employment strategy refers to di-
versity in work-time arrangements rather than to
atypical work. Part-time and temporary work offer
an opportunity for the integration of persons mar-
ginalised from the labour market. Promotion of
flexible work-time arrangements and the possibili-
ty to make transitions between different arrange-
ments by means of social security is necessary with
a view to addressing the needs encountered by in-
dividuals at different stages of life (European Com-
mission 2003a, 125–155). The problem is how to
find the right balance between flexibility and secur-
ity. Providing more opportunities for part-time and
temporary work via social security may be one way
to boost employment. In the longer term, however,
atypical work diminishes the quality of working life
and workers’ professional qualifications, and cre-
ates a significant risk of long-term unemployment
or complete exclusion from the labour market.
In Finland, part-time employment is substantially
less common than in the other Nordic countries. In
2003, less than 13 percent of Finnish workers were
in part-time employment, while the corresponding
shares in Sweden and Denmark were 21–22 percent
and in Norway 28 percent. The differences are larg-
est for women but the same pattern applies to men
as well. Among Finnish women, the share of the
part-time employed was a good 17 percent, com-
pared to about 33 percent among Swedes and Danes
and as high as 45 percent among Norwegians (ta-
ble 2.4).
Figure 2.2 looks at the degree to which the employ-
ment rates of different age groups in the Nordic
countries consist of part-time and full-time employ-
ment and analyses the extent to which part-time
employment is voluntary. The Figure shows that
only a relatively small share of those in part-time
employment wished to be employed full time, so
part-time employment is mostly voluntary in all
Nordic countries. An analysis by age group and sex
shows significant differences between the individ-
ual Nordic countries. For example, the differences
in the youth employment rate between the Nordic
countries are largely due to different patterns of
part-time employment. Men in their prime work-
ing years between 25 and 49 are almost exclusively
in full-time employment in all Nordic countries and
the cross-country differences are minor. In terms
of women, however, Finland stands apart from the
other Nordic countries, with Finnish women in the
25 to 49 age group being almost exclusively full-time
employed. A much lower of incidence of part-time
employment in Finland than in the other Nordic
countries is also observed with regard to ageing fe-
male workers. This is the case despite the fact that
Finland is presently the only Nordic country to of-
fer part-time pensions based solely on age criteria.
Fixed-term employment contracts have traditionally
been significantly more common in Finland than
in the rest of the Nordic countries or in the EU on
average (Kauhanen 2002). For the sake of improv-
ing the labour market position and employment
rate of women it is important to see whether Finn-
ish women, especially those of child-bearing age,
Table 2.4. Workers employed part-time as a share of all persons in work aged 15–64 in the Nordic countries,
2003.
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos.
Table 2.4
 
     
  Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Both sexes 12,6 22.0 28.1 20.6
Men 8.0 10.0 13.2 10.8
Women 17.5 34.9 44.8 32.6
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Figure 2.2. Employment rates in the Nordic countries divided into part-time and full-time employment, by age
and sex, 2003. (The figure above each column shows the part-time employed as a percentage of all persons in
work.)
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos.
are more likely to be in fixed-term employment than
their counterparts in the other Nordic countries. In
recent lively debate on short-term employment in
Finland, various commentators have drawn atten-
tion to the idea that back-to-back short employment
contracts and intervening periods of unemployment
make it particularly difficult for young women to
secure a steady income or to plan their personal
future and career.
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In Figure 2.3, we look at fixed-term employment
contracts as a proportion of total employment in
Finland, Sweden and Denmark, focusing on the 25–
39 age group, where starting a family and arrang-
ing child care for small children are topical concerns.
As expected, we find that Finnish women are more
likely than Swedish women and especially Danish
women to work in a fixed-term or temporary em-
ployment relationship. The share of women in the
25–39 age group working under a temporary con-
tract was 24%, 17% and 11%, respectively, in Fin-
land, Sweden and Denmark. The difference to Swe-
den is particularly noticeable when we focus on the
share of those involuntarily working under a fixed-
term contract. In Denmark, the prevalence of fixed-
term contracts is probably decreased by the relat-
ively low level of job security; in other words, em-
ployers see no need for fixed-term contracts as long
as redundancy is an easy option. In Sweden, the large
share of other than involuntary fixed-term contracts
might well be at least partially explained by a com-
paratively high rate of job rotation, involving the
hiring of substitutes for workers on temporary leave
of absence. On the whole, our comparison suggests
that Finnish women of child-bearing age have a
weaker labour market position than their counter-
parts in the other Nordic countries.
Effective rate of employment
The employment rate alone does not give a full pic-
ture of the cross-country variation in the total work
effort of the working-age population. In labour
force surveys, those in work are defined as persons
who have been in paid employment for at least one
hour during the survey week as well as persons who
have spent the entire week on a temporary leave of
absence for such reasons as inclement weather con-
ditions, annual holiday, illness or maternity/paren-
tal leave. The structure of income security deter-
mines to a large degree the importance of tempor-
ary work absences to the overall rate of employment.
The greater the opportunities afforded by the so-
cial security system for temporary absences (while
receiving sickness or parental allowance, for in-
stance), the more slack there is in the employment
rate compared to countries where the provision of
social security is linked more to unemployment and
to benefits provided to those outside the labour
force. Longer yet temporary absences from work
also have the tendency to raise the employment rate
for the reason that a single job often generates two
employed persons, with both the absentee and the
substitute being recorded as ’in work’ for the pur-
pose of labour force surveys (Haataja 2005). There-
fore, it is worthwhile to complement our compar-
ison of Nordic employment rates by calculating an
effective rate of employment where the effect of
temporary work absences is eliminated. This meas-
ure is popular in Sweden and Norway, both of them
countries where temporary absences are much more
common than in either Finland or Denmark (see
www.fk.se and www.ssb.no).
Figure 2.4 shows that Denmark’s rank in the Nor-
dic employment comparison is improved further
when we compare the effective rate of employment.
An average of 13.2% Danes in work were absent
from work during the survey week, giving an effec-
Figure 2.3. Employees in fixed-term and temporary employment contracts as a share of all employees aged
25 to 39 in Finland, Sweden and Denmark, 2003.
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos.
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tive rate of employment of 65.2%. Finland had the
second lowest rate incidence of absences covering
the entire survey week (14.6%), while Sweden had
the highest (17.1%). This translates to an effective
rate of employment of 57.9% for Finland and 60.4
for Sweden. The share of the working-age popula-
tion not absent from work throughout the survey
week was only 2.6 percentage points higher in Swe-
den than in Finland, compared to a gap of 5.2 per-
centage points between their employment rates.
Paid employment measured by the hours
worked
In the foregoing, we compared the labour force par-
ticipation of Finns and other Nordic populations
on a number of measures. What, then, should we
conclude from our findings: do Finns engage in paid
employment more or less than their Scandinavian
neighbours? To find an answer, we shall extend our
analysis by yet another indicator, which provides a
more accurate picture of labour input. The analysis
is based on data on ”actual hours worked” record-
ed by the labour force survey.
Hours worked is a much more precise measure of
the total labour input than the number of persons
in work. Differences in hours worked provide a
summary measure of the differences in total labour
input arising from disparities in the number of those
in paid employment, in the normal fluctuation of
working times, in part-time work, and in tempor-
ary absences from work. Hours worked is also an
important starting-point for comparing productiv-
ity. Cross-country comparisons of actual hours
worked are conducted under a number of different
methodological approaches; they may also pursue
different objectives (OECD 2004).
In table 2.5, we compare the labour input measured
by hours worked in the Nordic countries by divid-
ing the total number of hours worked in a year by
the number of persons in paid employment. The
table also includes an extrapolation of the increase
in employment rate and the number of persons in
work in Finland assuming that the total sum of
hours worked is as reported in the Finnish labour
force survey, but the hours worked per employed
person are equal to that seen in another Nordic
country. In other words, the table indicates how
many more persons in employment would have
been needed in Finland, if they had worked as ”lit-
tle”, on average, as the employed persons in each of
the other Nordic countries.
Figure 2.4. Employment rate in the Nordic countries according to the presence or absence of the worker
during the survey week, 2002. (The figures in brackets show those absent for the entire survey week as a
percentage of all persons in work.)
Source: National labour force surveys.
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The number of hours worked per year and per
employed person was highest in Finland, reaching
1,682 hours in 2002. The smallest number of hours
worked per employed person, 1,524 hours, was seen
in Norway. Denmark’s figure was not far from Fin-
land’s, while Sweden fell between Norway and Fin-
land but closer to the former. The calculation con-
cerning the effect of variations in the distribution
of the hours worked shows that when the total sum
of hours worked by Finns is distributed across the
working-age population in the same way as it is in
Norway, the difference between the Finnish and
Norwegian rates of employment disappears. When
the Finnish case is adjusted to correspond to the
Swedish experience, the rate of employment in Fin-
land is increased by about 4 percentage points. Fi-
nally, a redistribution of the hours worked in Fin-
land in line with the Danish figures increases the
Finnish employment rate by only about 2 percent-
age points.
3  Characterisation of benefits and their
utilisation
In this section, we provide an overview of the vari-
ous earnings-replacement benefits in the Nordic
countries and present statistical data about their
utilisation rates. The structure of the benefits, their
compensation levels, and the factors influencing
their utilisation will be discussed in more detail in
section 4.
3.1 Nordic differences in the distribution
of benefits in a nutshell
Compared on the basis of the utilisation of ben-
efits, the Nordic countries are ranged in distinct po-
sitions on an illness-unemployment scale (figure
3.1). Norway stands out when it comes to the utili-
sation of health-related benefits, while in Finland
the emphasis is on benefits provided for labour
market reasons.
Of working-age Norwegians, 15.3% on average were
in receipt of sickness or rehabilitation allowance or
on disability pension, while the share of those un-
employed or participating in labour market policy
measures was as low as 2.9%. In Sweden, the pro-
portion of persons receiving a health-related ben-
efit was a little under 2 percentage points lower than
in Norway, but the share of those either unemployed
or participating in labour market policy measures
was correspondingly nearly 4 percentage points
higher.
Table 2.5. The number of hours worked per employed person and the total employment in Finland under
alternative distributions of the hours worked: Finland compared to the other Nordic countries, 2002.
1Includes only the hours worked by persons of working age. Persons in employment include also those absent from work for the entire
week.
Sources: The data on the hours worked and the employed persons between ages 16 and 64 are from national statistical offices; the
employment rates are from Eurostat.
Table 2.5 
 
     
  Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Number of hours worked annually per  employed 
person aged 16 to 64 1 1 682 1 584 1 524 1 637
     
Employment rate (15–64) 68.1 73.6 75.4 75.9
     
Increase in the number of employed persons in Finland 
if the hours worked were distributed among the employed 
population as in the other Nordic countries     
– Increase in the number of employed . 146 000 244 000 65 000
– Increase in the employment rate (percentage points) . 4.2 7.0 1.9
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In Finland, an average of 9.4% of the working-aged
population were in receipt of health-related ben-
efits, which was about 6 percentage points lower
than in Norway and 4 points lower than in Sweden.
The lowest share of recipients of such benefits, 7.4%,
was seen in Denmark (this excludes the smallest
early retirement pensions).
Compared with the rest of the Nordic countries, the
biggest problem in Finland appears to be the large
number of unemployed job seekers. An average of
8.7% of the working-aged population – 2 or 3 times
as many as in the other Nordic countries – was regis-
tered by the labour authorities as seeking employ-
ment in 2002. Adding those on unemployment pen-
sion or participating in labour market policy meas-
ures, we get a share of 13% of the Finnish working-
age population who were outside the labour mar-
ket for one labour market related reason or another.
Under this broad definition of unemployment,
more than four times as many Finns as Norwegians,
and about twice as many Finns as Swedes, were un-
employed. Denmark had the second highest share
of persons on one labour market benefit or another.
3.2 Income security benefits provided
for health reasons
Income security during sickness absence
In all Nordic countries, loss of income due to sick-
ness absence is compensated from three different
sources. Employers typically have statutory respon-
sibility for covering the initial period of incapacity,
after which benefits are provided under national
sickness insurance arrangements. Along with sick-
ness allowances, the Nordic countries have provi-
sions for supplementary benefits based on labour
market agreements which take the form alternatively
of sick pay or benefits based on collective insurance.
The period of statutory coverage by the employer is
aimed at preventing unnecessary use of benefits and
keeping employers motivated to look after their
workers’ health. In Finland, employers are under the
Employment Contracts Act required to provide
their workers with full pay for the day of onset of
incapacity and the following 9 weekdays (including
Saturdays). In Norway, employers pay a sickness al-
lowance for 16 days, and in Denmark, for 2 weeks.
Until July 2003, Swedish employers were required
to pay statutory sick pay for 2 weeks, which was pre-
ceded by a one-day waiting period. During the fol-
lowing 1.5 years, the employer period was 3 weeks,
after which it was again shortened to 2 weeks.
Figure 3.1. Recipients of health related benefits and ”large umemployment” as a share of the aged 16–64,
2002.
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The Nordic countries differ in terms of how much
autonomy they allow insured persons in the assess-
ment of work incapacity at the onset of illness. The
Finnish provisions are the strictest in this respect.
Employers may require workers to present a medi-
cal certificate for the very first day of incapacity. In
Sweden, a medical certificate is not required until
the 8th day of incapacity. While public debate on
sickness absenteeism in Sweden has been lively, this
rule has never been called into question. In Norway
and Denmark, a medical certificate is required from
the 4th day of incapacity. However, Danish workers
must present written notification of their incapa-
city on the 2nd day.
Sickness allowance from health insurance becomes
payable once the employer-covered period ends.
The Nordic countries differ in terms of the maxi-
mum duration of the allowance. In Finland, Nor-
way and Denmark, sickness allowance can be paid
for a total of about a year within any period of 2 or
3 years. While Sweden applies no maximum limit,
a reform carried out in 2003 established the objec-
tive that sickness allowance should generally not be
awarded for a period exceeding three years. In Nor-
way, various rehabilitation benefits serve the same
purpose as the Swedish sickness allowances extend-
ing past the one-year mark. This is seen for exam-
ple in the a report by the Norwegian social security
agency Rikstrygdeverket, according to which per-
sons who retired on a disability pension had dur-
ing the four years preceding their retirement spent
an average of 2.3 years on sickness and rehabilita-
tion allowance (RTV 2003, 28).
In all of the Nordic countries, sick pay is a major
addition to the statutory sickness allowance (see
NOSOSKO 2004). In Sweden, supplementary sick-
ness cover is also provided by collective insurance
financed by the labour market parties.
Disability pensions
In Finland, Sweden and Norway, statutory disability
pensions are comprised of an earnings-related em-
ployment pension and a universal state pension. In
Denmark, disability pensions are available only from
the state pension system. In Sweden and Finland,
the state pension is a minimum pension that sets
the basic level of retirement provision, while in
Norway it is a flat-rate basic pension.
The Danish disability pension is grounded in a dif-
ferent philosophy than the disability pensions of the
other Nordic countries. Since 2003, it has been paid
only to persons who have been diagnosed as fully
and permanently disabled for work and who have
no other options left, such as activation or rehabil-
itation measures. Those who have some remaining
capacity for work but whose employability cannot
be restored, are referred to supported employment
specially designed for persons with impaired func-
tioning (so-called flexjob). Pensions granted before
2003 are covered under sunset provisions which
divide ”premature pensions” (førtidspensioner)
into four categories (ETK 2002; Sociale ydelser
2004).
Pensions and allowances payable in respect of
partial incapacity for work
The sickness allowances and disability pensions
provided in the Nordic countries differ greatly in
terms of how the degree of incapacity for work is
defined and the extent to which those with an im-
paired capacity for work are realistically able to make
use of their remaining capacity for work by com-
bining benefits and paid work.
A partial sickness allowance is available in Sweden,
Norway and Denmark. A similar benefit is sched-
uled to be introduced in Finland in 2006; however,
the Finnish benefit is designed to serve a distinctly
different purpose. Its main intention is to help per-
sons absent from work for medical reasons to re-
turn to work, and it will be paid only for a period
not to exceed 3 months. In the other Nordic coun-
tries, the partial sickness allowance is also aimed at
helping incapacitated persons participate in work
at all stages of their illness.
The most conspicuous difference between the pro-
posed Finnish system and the existing Scandinavi-
an partial sickness allowance systems is in the cri-
teria by which incapacity for work is defined. In Fin-
land, the definition of incapacity will be the same
as is applied to full-time absence from work, which
will result in the allowance mainly offering a chance
for incapacitated persons to test their work ability
once recovery has progressed to a certain point. In
the other Nordic countries, partial sickness allow-
ance is determined by reference to the degree of
deterioration in work capacity. In Sweden, the al-
lowance is provided in three grades: ¼, ½ and ¾,
while in Norway partial sickness allowance is avail-
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able if one’s capacity for work declines by 50–90%.
One peculiarity of the Norwegian system is that
partial sickness allowance is also available for work-
ers who work normal hours but whose work input
is reduced. In Denmark, the amount of the partial
sickness allowance is linked to the reduction in
working hours. It is payable for a reduction as small
as 4 weekly working hours.
Partial disability pension is available in Sweden,
Norway and Finland, but not in Denmark. In Swe-
den and Norway, the rules concerning the recog-
nised degrees of disability are the same as are ap-
plied to sickness allowances. In Finland, a partial
disability pension is available under the earnings-
related employment pension system provided one’s
capacity for work has diminished by at least two
fifths but by no more than three fifths. In Denmark,
flexjob serves some of the same purpose as the par-
tial disability pension. It is available to incapacitat-
ed workers who have some work capacity left. Em-
ployers pay flexjob workers a normal wage, half or
two thirds of which is compensated by the munici-
pality.
Utilisation of health-related benefits
As noted above, the total utilisation rate of all dis-
ability benefits combined is significantly higher in
Norway and Sweden than in either Finland or Den-
mark (section 3.1). These cross-country differences
are diminished somewhat if we convert the partial
benefits into full-time absences. Following this con-
version, we get disability benefit utilisation rates of
14% (Norway), 12% (Sweden) and 9% (Finland and
Denmark). The Danish rate drops to 7% if we ex-
clude the smallest premature pensions granted pri-
marily on social criteria.
In recent years, Norway and Sweden have left Fin-
land far behind in terms of the number of people
in receipt of disability pension. Of Norwegians and
Swedes of working age, 9% received a full or partial
disability pension, compared to only 7.5% in Fin-
land. This gap is even wider if the Swedish sickness
allowances paid for a period longer than a year and
the long-term rehabilitation allowances available in
Norway are considered as disability pensions for
purposes of comparison with Finland. In Denmark,
recipients of a disability pension accounted for 5–
7% of the population depending on whether small
premature pensions granted partially or totally on
social criteria were taken into account (Table 3.1).
It is an open question whether partial disability ben-
efits are more likely to increase total work effort in
Sweden at the expense of full-time absence than to
make the benefits more attractive and thereby in-
crease their overall utilisation. In recent years, par-
tial benefits have accounted for a share of a little
over one fourth of the total number of compensat-
ed days in Sweden, compared to one fifth in Nor-
way and about 5% in Denmark (NOSOSKO 2005).
In Sweden and Norway, the ratio of the recipients
of partial benefits to all beneficiaries is the same also
in the case of disability pensions (RTV 2003;
www.rfv.se). The utilisation of partial benefits is so
common in both Sweden and Norway that it can be
presumed to have an effect on the rate of employ-
ment. In person years, a little short of 190,000 per-
sons in Sweden and about 77,000 persons in Nor-
way received partial disability benefits in the form
of a sickness allowance or disability pension in 2002,
representing a share of 3.7% and 2.7%, respective-
ly, of the working-age populations.
All recipients of partial disability benefits, however,
are not included in the employment rate. They may
draw a partial unemployment allowance or subsist
on a diminished benefit without participating in
paid employment. Labour force participation
among recipients of a partial pension has been ex-
amined in Norway and Finland. In the former,
around 75%, and in the later, a good 60%, were in
paid employment. (Gould et al. 2003; RTV 2003,
96.)
In Denmark, the utilisation of the flexjob option,
effectively a replacement of partial disability pen-
sion, had been increasing already before the 2003
pension reform. Converted into full-time employ-
ment, the number of flexjob workers in Denmark
numbered 19,000 in 2002, or double the amount in
the preceding year. Premature pensions provided
under the previous legislation on social grounds
(either partially or totally) were paid to about 66,000
persons in 2002 (DST 2003a; NOSOSKO 2004).
3.3 Pathways to early retirement
Disability pensions payable on medical grounds are
in all of the Nordic countries the principal and most
enduring form of early retirement provision prior
to the old-age pension. Other alternative statutory
pathways into early retirement include the pensions
granted for labour market reasons and age-based
part-time pensions. Further, there is the possibility
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of retirement on collectively bargained non-statu-
tory pension arrangements. Early retirement op-
tions have in recent years been pared down in all
Nordic countries at the same time as the qualifying
conditions for old-age pensions have been made
more flexible by the elimination of a fixed pension-
able age and other measures.
Finland and Denmark are presently the only Nor-
dic countries with a statutory early retirement pen-
sion provided on grounds of labour market policy. In
Finland, this pension option takes the form of un-
employment pension, and in Denmark, that of the
efterløn (”post-employment wage”), an early retire-
ment pension provided out of the unemployment
insurance scheme. The pensionable age for both the
Finnish unemployment pension and the Danish
efterløn is 60 years. In Finland, the unemployment
pension is part of the statutory old-age and disabil-
ity pensions system. Under the terms of a pension
reform implemented in 2005, the unemployment
pension will be phased out and the special retire-
ment needs of the elderly unemployed will be ad-
ministered to out of the unemployment insurance
scheme. The Danish efterløn is available to long-term
members of an unemployment fund and is paid out
of the unemployment protection budget. It was
originally designed to curtail the supply and increase
the turnover of labour (European Commission
2003b). However, it is also possible to go on efterløn
Table 3.1. Recipients of health-related income security benefits as a percentage of the working age population
and the share of partial benefits of all health-related benefits in the Nordic countries, 2002.1
1 The data on sickness and rehabilitation benefits are shown in person-years, the data on pensions and unemployed persons reflects the
situation at the end of the year, and active labour market measures are shown as average participation during the year.
2 Daily allowance days compensated under the insurance arrangement for small employers have been deducted, according to an estimate,
from the data on sickness benefits for Denmark.
Sources: ETK and Kela 2003; ILO 2003; NOSOSKO 2004.
 
Benefit Finland Sweden Norway Denmark 
Persons on health-related benefit, total 9.4 13.5 15.3 9.0 
 –  Converted to full-time recipiency 9.2 11.8 13.9 9.0 
Persons on sickness benefit, total 1.6 4.6 4.4 1.6 
Less than a year 1.6 2.5 4.4   1.6 2 
– Converted to full-time recipiency 1.6 2.1 3.9 1.6 
More than a year ¨ 2.1 ¨ ¨ 
– Converted to full-time recipiency ¨ 1.9 ¨ ¨ 
Persons on rehabilitation benefit 0.3 0.3 1.8 0.6 
Persons on disability pension 7.5 8.6 9.1 4.9 
– Converted to full-time recipiency 7.3 7.5 8.2 4.9 
Persons on other pension payable for 
health and/or social reasons ¨ ¨ ¨ 1.9 
Approximate share of partial benefits (%)     
– of sickness benefits . 25 20 5 
– of disability pensions 5 25 20 . 
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directly from paid employment. This is why the
efterløn can also be seen as an age-based special pen-
sion (NOSOSKO 2004).
Special provisions for elderly workers as part of the
unemployment protection system exist in both Fin-
land and Denmark as well as to a certain extent in
Sweden. In Finland, retirement on an unemploy-
ment pension is preceded by passage through a so-
called ”unemployment pipeline”, which guarantees
uninterrupted coverage for earnings-related ben-
efits from the age of 57 until entitlement to a disa-
bility pension. In Denmark, earnings-related cov-
erage for those aged 55 years or over continues un-
til they reach age 60, provided they satisfy the eligi-
bility criteria for the efterløn. Certain transitional
benefits have also been granted out of the unem-
ployment protection budget for those unemployed
persons who are over 50 years of age and meet the
efterløn criteria. Such benefits were granted in 1993–
1995, but because of their long duration, some re-
mained in payment as of the early 2000s. One dif-
ference of this Danish arrangement to the Finnish
”unemployment pipeline” is that recipients of the
transitional benefits were required to leave the la-
bour force entirely, whereas the long-term unem-
ployed passing through the Finnish ”unemploy-
ment pipeline” were registered as job seekers though
not nearly always actively seeking employment with-
in the meaning of the labour force survey. In Swe-
den, the elderly unemployed are entitled to unem-
ployment compensation lasting 450 days, while oth-
er unemployed persons can only get ”passive” un-
employment benefits for a maximum of 300 days.
In Finland, 21% of the population aged 60–64 years
were in receipt of unemployment pension, while in
Denmark, efterløn was paid to as many as 43% of
the equivalent age group. Only about a fifth of those
retiring on efterløn had previously received unem-
ployment benefit. A number of steps have been tak-
en to reduce the utilisation of the efterløn, includ-
ing making it more flexible with regard to combin-
ing paid work and retirement. The pension can be
adjusted up or down in relation to the number of
hours worked. Incentives have also been built into
the system to reward the insured for postponing
retirement. However, the reforms have had little ef-
fect. (DST 2003a; European Commission 2003b;
ETK and Kela 2003; NOSOSKO 2004.)
Some have criticised the high rate of utilisation of
the Finnish early retirement options available on
grounds of labour policy, arguing that the ”pension
pipeline” offers employers and employees the
chance agree between themselves on the utilisation
of benefits without giving the public authorities
much say in the matter. Yet on the other hand, it
has been shown that use of the ”unemployment
pathway” has been determined largely by the de-
mand for labour. In its economic and employment
policy, Finland has given priority to the open sec-
tors of the economy and the industries most ex-
posed to global competition. Unlike several conti-
nental European countries, Finland has succeeded
in adjusting the retirement pathways available to
elderly workers to the prevailing social and econom-
ic circumstances by consultations between the gov-
ernment and the labour market parties. (Hytti
2004b.)
Part-time pensions based entirely on age and not at
all on medical criteria are available in Finland and
Denmark. In practice, however, part-time pensions
are a viable option only in Finland. A total of 41,000
persons were in receipt of a part-time pension as of
the end of 2003. Because the Danish efterløn is also
available as a part-time benefit, a separate part-time
pension is only paid to those individuals who are
not entitled to a part-time efterløn. In Sweden, part-
time pensions were discontinued as part of a re-
form of the old-age retirement security provisions.
The share of pensioners in the 50–64 age
group
Figure 3.2 shows the recipients of pensions or equiv-
alent benefits as a share of the population aged 50–
64 years in the Nordic countries. When all avenues
of exit from paid employment (not including old-
age pensions) are considered, Finland stands apart
from its Nordic neighbours in terms of the high
utilisation of early retirement pensions. In Den-
mark, the share of pensioners in the 50–64 popula-
tion is near that of Finland, but here too the analy-
sis is confounded by the availability of the efterløn,
which is to some extent equivalent to an age-based
pension.
Early retirement pensions were being paid to 30%
of the Finns aged 50–64, compared to just 20–23%
of the Swedes and of the Norwegians. If the analy-
sis is extended to include health-related benefits paid
for more than a year, the difference between Fin-
land its neighbour countries remains at 5–7 per-
centage points.
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3.4 Unemployment protection2
The Nordic countries differ significantly in terms
of unemployment protection. One major difference
is in the distribution of benefits between ”passive”
cash benefits and activation measures. Another key
difference can be seen in the extent to which the
administration of unemployment protection is en-
trusted to the labour markets and to what extent it
is the responsibility of the central government. The
prevalence of means testing is a third important
point of divergence.
Earnings-related unemployment protection is vol-
untary in Finland, Sweden and Denmark and com-
pulsory in Norway. In Sweden and Finland, non-
members of unemployment funds are entitled to
basic unemployment allowance. There is no basic
unemployment allowance in Denmark, but non-
members of unemployment funds are eligible for a
municipal living allowance, which is relatively gen-
erous but conditional on participation in activation
measures. Finland differs from the other Nordic
countries in that unemployment protection in-
cludes, along with unemployment insurance proper
(basic and earnings-related unemployment allow-
ances), also a means-tested benefit called the labour
market subsidy, which is payable to persons who
are just entering the labour market and to those who
have exhausted their entitlement to basic or earn-
ings-related unemployment allowance. In the fol-
lowing we limit our description mainly to compar-
ing the length of time for which earnings-related
unemployment allowances are available and the
relative roles of passive cash benefits and activation
measures.
In Finland, earnings-related unemployment allow-
ances and non-means-tested basic allowances are
payable for up to 23 months in total. Prior to be-
coming unemployed, the recipient must have been
gainfully employed for at least 43 weeks within the
last two years. The length of previous employment
required is approximately the same as that required
in Denmark (one year within the last three years),
but longer than in Sweden, where only 6 months of
employment within the previous 12 months is re-
quired. The Nordic countries differ also with regard
to the rules concerning requalification for benefits.
In this respect, Finland and Denmark apply much
stricter rules than Sweden, because they do not re-
cognise supported employment alone as requali-
fying a person for unemployment benefits. (MIS-
SOC 2003.)
In Denmark, earnings-related unemployment ben-
efits are payable for a total of four years. During the
first year, unemployed persons are expected to look
Figure 3.2. Population aged 50–64 in the Nordic countries: Take-up rates of disability pensions, part-time
pensions and pensions based on labour market reasons.
2 Extended unemployment protection for elderly workers is covered in secti-
on 3.3.
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for work on their own initiative. In the following
three years, at least 75% of the time on benefit must
be dedicated to activation measures (Bredgaard et
al. 2003; MISSOC 2003). One of the features dis-
tinguishing the high level of unemployment pro-
tection in Denmark from the Finnish system is the
ability of the Danish system to combat structural
unemployment without driving down unemploy-
ment benefits and driving away a growing share of
the unemployed from the earnings-related unem-
ployment allowance system into the municipal liv-
ing allowance system.
In Sweden, the maximum length of earnings-rela-
ted unemployment allowance is normally 300 days,
but it can be extended to 600 days by a separate de-
cision. Also in Sweden, an increasing number of
unemployed individuals, mainly immigrants and
young people, are left entirely outside the unem-
ployment fund system (Palme and Wennemo 1997).
In practice, however, unemployed persons rarely
lose their entitlement to earnings-related benefits
and have to rely on income support. This is because
of three things. For the first, the ’activity guarantee’
introduced in 2000 ensures that earnings-related
benefits continue to be paid as long as the recipient
participates in a basically full-time activation pro-
gramme until he or she finds employment in the
open labour market or otherwise requalifies for
earnings-related benefits. Second, it is easier than
in Finland to resatisfy the eligibility requirements
regarding previous employment by participating in
supported employment arranged in the private sec-
tor. Third, a large number of the long-term unem-
ployed have begun to receive sickness allowance, in
many cases just when their entitlement to unem-
ployment benefits is about to end. (Forslund et al.
2004.)
In Norway, unemployment benefits are payable for
three years. Because of low structural unemploy-
ment, activation measures are not common.
The utilisation rates of unemployment benefits
In the Nordic countries the total population receiv-
ing passive or active labour market benefits can be
approximated in a cross sectional situation by sum-
ming up the number of registered unemployed per-
sons and the number of persons participating in
active labour market measures. An overview based
on this definition of large unemployment was pre-
sented figure 3.1 (section 3.1) and in table 3.2. For
this study we have not gathered statistical informa-
tion on unemployment daily allowance benefits in
the Nordic countries. Instead we use the number of
the registered unemployed, which is a rather good
approximation of the number of people receiving
full-time unemployment benefits. However, it must
be taken into consideration that both in Sweden and
in Finland approximately 10–15 percent of all regis-
tered unemployed persons dropped out of the un-
employment benefit systems around the turn of
the century (Bergmark and Palme, 2003; Kela/Stakes
database, 2000). Considering the purpose of this
study, it would be important to compare also the
utilisation of the partial unemployment benefits and
the possibility to combine these benefits with paid
work in the individual Nordic countries (see Euro-
stat 2005). Also the question about means-testing
of the benefits should be discussed more thoroughly.
However, for practical reasons we limit our statisti-
cal presentation to the general overview presented
in table 3.2.
When the structure of the beneficiary population
is analysed, Sweden is seen to put in relative terms
the greatest emphasis on active labour market poli-
cies. The total share of large unemployment in
working-age population was 6.7%, of which one
half was in active labour market measures. In Den-
mark, the utilisation rate of passive cash benefits
was significantly higher (4.2%) and participation
in active labour market measures lower (2.5%) de-
spite the international renown enjoyed by the acti-
vation-oriented Danish labour market policy.
In Finland, activation measures are used in relative
terms much less than in Sweden or Denmark when
comparisons are made as a share of the total number
of beneficiaries. However, the number of partici-
pants in ALMP measures as a share of the working-
age population is in Finland nearly the same as in
Denmark (2.2% and 2.5%, respectively). With re-
gard to the utilisation of  ”passive” cash benefits,
Finland was in a league of its own, with 10.8% of
the working-age population receiving cash benefits
(being registered unemployed or receiving unem-
ployment pensions) compared to 8% in Denmark
(including efterløn) and 3.3% in Sweden.
3.5 Balancing work and family life
Long family leaves and comprehensive day care
services are a common feature of all of the Nordic
countries, which has enabled them to create a bet-
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ter environment for combining work and family
responsibilities than many other countries and
helped them to maintain a comparatively high rate
of fertility. Family benefits like other income secur-
ity arrangements influence the functioning of la-
bour markets through a number of institutional
incentives and disincentives focusing on both em-
ployers and insured persons. For one, family ben-
efits affect how young adults perceive their possi-
bilities of starting a family and when they are likely
to time any decision to do so. The important thing
is not only the level of benefits but also the length
of family leaves and sufficient freedom of choice re-
garding the demands of work and family and the
distribution of duties within the family. A partic-
ular problem of the Finnish and to some extent the
Swedish labour market is seen in the prevalence of
atypical work relationships among women of child-
bearing age and the uneven distribution of family
leave costs between different sectors of the econ-
omy and between individual employers. According
to a statement issued by Finnish service sector em-
ployers (Palvelutyönantajat 2003 and 2004), the
situation as it stands also weakens the employment
situation and leaves unused much of the potential
that exists for increasing the employment rate.
In the following, we shall compare the length of
parental leaves and the level of parental benefits in
the Nordic countries (table 3.3). Particular atten-
tion is paid to the ability to combine work and fam-
ily demands flexibly and the individual freedom of
choice regarding leave arrangements and the dis-
tribution of tasks within the family. The focus is on
leaves in connection with childbirth, temporary
leave of absence to look after a sick child and home
care allowances available as an alternative to public
day care services.
Parental allowances
The allowances payable during maternity, paternity
or parental leave are equal in amount to the sick-
ness allowance in all of the Nordic countries. Al-
though earnings-related, the maternity allowances
– unlike the sickness allowances – are paid at a ba-
sic minimum rate even if the recipient has no pre-
Table 3.2. Persons participating in labour market policy measures, registered as unemployed persons or
receiving pension for labour market reasons, as a percentage of the working-age population in the Nordic
countries, 20021.
 Finland Sweden Norway Denmark  
Large unemployment, total 13.0 6.7 2.9 10.5  
On unemployment pension / 
efterløn 1.7             ¨             ¨   3.8 2 
On farm closure allowance 0.4             ¨             ¨             ¨  
Registered as unemployed 8.7 3.3 2.6 4.2  
Participating in labour market 
policy measure 2.2 3.4 0.3 2.5  
− Other than supported 
employment 1.1 1.9 0.3 1.4  
− In supported 
employment 1.1 1.5 0.1 1.1   
1 Pension recipients and unemployed persons as at year-end; persons participating in labour market policy measures on the basis of the
average participation rate for the entire year.
2 Among efterløn recipients, the shares of persons with and without a preceding period of unemployment are approximately 1.1 and 2.7
percentage-points, respectively.
Sources: ETK and Kela 2003; ILO 2003; NOSOSKO 2004.
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vious earnings. The leave of absence covered by the
parental allowances is quite long in all of the Nor-
dic countries. The maternity and parental leave has
always been longest in Sweden and, until a reform
enacted in 2002, shortest in Denmark. The reform
moved Denmark past Finland and Norway in terms
of the length of the parental allowance period. How-
ever, the picture changes significantly if the home
care allowances available exclusively in Finland and
Norway are taken into account.
Table 3.3. Parental and child care benefits in the Nordic countries at year-end 20031.
1 For the income caps, see table 4.1.
2 Fathers are entitled to a 2-week ”bonus leave” if they take the last two weeks or more of the regular parental benefit days.
3 Paid for 90 days at the rate of the basic benefit not related to earnings.
4 Attendance of municipal day care does not preclude payment of the partial care allowance.
Sources: RTV 2003; NOSOSKO 2004.
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In terms of the ability to combine work and family
responsibilities, the Finnish allowance system is
much less flexible and offers much less freedom of
choice than the equivalent systems in the other
Nordic countries. This applies equally well to the
total length of the parental allowance period, the
ability to break down the allowance period into
shorter segments, the availability of part-time ben-
efit arrangements, and the ability of fathers to go
on parental leave.
In both Norway and Denmark, it is possible to
choose from a number of alternatives customised
in terms of the length of the allowance period and
the earnings replacement rate, and to flexibly com-
bine a part-time allowance with paid employment
under a specific time account arrangement. Parents
may choose whether they wish to draw parental al-
lowance for a shorter period of time at a 100% earn-
ings replacement rate (up to a specified earnings
cap), or draw the allowance longer but at a lower
replacement rate. The parental allowance period,
whether 42 or 52 weeks as in Norway or 52, 60 or
66 weeks as in Denmark, can also be spread out over
a longer period of time by combining it with part-
time employment. While similar arrangements al-
lowing parents to combine different replacement
rates and allowance periods are not available in
Sweden, the parental allowance is available on a
part-time basis (1/8, 1/2, 1/4, 3/4), in which case
the allowance period is lengthened corresponding-
ly. A part-time parental allowance is also available
in Finland, albeit with the proviso that both par-
ents must be on part-time status at the same time.
(MISSOC 2003; Haataja 2004a; NOSOSKO 2004.)
In all of the Nordic countries, it is possible to take a
separate paternity leave irrespective of any other
parental leave decisions, consisting of 2–3 weeks
around the time of a child’s birth. The parental al-
lowance includes a ”father’s quota” in all of the
Nordic countries except Denmark. In Sweden, 8
weeks of the parental leave is allocated to both par-
ents. In Norway, 4 weeks of the parental leave is set
aside for use by the father. In Finland, the father’s
quota is subject to conditions which provide fathers
an additional two weeks of leave at the end of the
parental leave if they take the last two weeks of the
parental leave period.
Finland is the only Nordic country where the pa-
rental allowance cannot be split into several per-
iods. In Sweden, all of the parental allowance must
be taken before the child’s 8th birthday, and in Den-
mark, before the child’s 10th birthday. In Norway,
the allowance can be spread out over a period of
two years. (MISSOC 2003; Haataja 2004a.)
The utilisation rates of flexible parental
allowance arrangements
While there are considerable differences between the
Nordic countries in the flexibility of parental leaves,
statistical evidence suggests that these differences
are not as consequential to the ability and willing-
ness to combine work and family responsibilities as
one might expect merely by comparing the legal
provisions. Of course, any conclusions we may draw
from this evidence should be tempered by the
awareness that women in the other Nordic coun-
tries are much more commonly in part-time work
than Finnish women.
In Norway, about 75% of mothers chose the lower
parental benefit rate and a correspondingly longer
benefit duration in 2001. Yet only 2% of those re-
ceiving parental allowance took advantage of the
possibility to combine part-time work and partial
allowance under a time account arrangement (NO-
SOSKO 2004). Swedish parents took about 2 per-
cent of all of the parental allowance days after their
child was past the age of 18 months. About 7% of
the maternity and parental leave days were covered
on a part-time employment basis in 2003
(www.rfv.se). In Sweden, part-time work between
two periods of maternity leave has been made more
attractive by a provision which ensures that the al-
lowance is not decreased if another child is born
within 2.5 years (Haataja 2004b). In Finland, the
number of parents choosing the part-time parental
allowance is vanishingly small, with only 40 moth-
ers and fathers taking advantage of this option in
2003. The unpopularity would appear to be due to
stringent qualifying conditions.
Payment of parental allowances to fathers
The extent to which parental allowances are paid to
fathers in the individual Nordic countries is clearly
related to the length of the ”father’s quota” and how
flexibly it can be used. In Finland and Denmark,
fathers took about 5%, in Norway 9% and in Swe-
den 17% of the days for which parental allowance
was available in connection with childbirth. While
there is a growing tendency also in Finland for fa-
thers to take parental leave days, the growth has so
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far been due to increasing utilisation of the pater-
nity allowance paid consecutively with the mater-
nity allowance. The ”bonus leave” tagged on to the
end of the parental leave period was used by 4,000
fathers in 2004. According to Haataja (2004b), fa-
thers’ ability and willingness to use the father’s quota
specifically and parental leave in general is limited
in Finland by lack of flexibility in the governing pro-
visions. For example, the benefit period cannot be
postponed as it can in the other Nordic countries,
although it might make practical sense to take the
father’s share of the parental leave after the child
care leave taken by the mother, during a time when
the family, no longer entitled to the parental allow-
ance, receives the home care allowance available as
an alternative to municipal day care. Another de-
motivating factor when it comes to the utilisation
of the parental leave by fathers is that many moth-
ers do not have a job to which they can return.
Statutory and contractual pay during maternity
and parental leave
No comparative data are available about the provi-
sions concerning statutory or contractual pay dur-
ing maternity and parental leave. However, con-
tractual pay is in all Nordic countries less common
during the maternity and parental leaves than it is
during sickness absences. Nor is there any need for
contractual arrangements in Denmark and Norway
owing to the 100% earnings replacement rate (ex-
cept for cases where the employee exceeds the sta-
tutory cap on earnings). In Finland, about half of
those receiving earnings-related maternity allow-
ance received maternity pay at the beginning of the
maternity allowance period. A Swedish study indi-
cates that employers typically paid a small amount
on top of the statutory allowance (Jansson et al.
2003).
Temporary absence to look after a sick child
Short absences caused by a sudden illness or need
of care of a small child are in Finland and Denmark
covered on a contractual basis. In Sweden and Nor-
way, there is a special allowance roughly equal to
the parental allowance. In Norway, receipt of this
allowance is subject to a 10-day waiting period. In
2003, a total of 4.5 million days were covered under
the Swedish system, which was equivalent to about
one-tenth of the days covered under the parental
insurance system. (See Sosialdepartementet 2003;
www.rfv.se.)
Home care allowance
Among the Nordic countries, only Finland and
Norway have a home care allowance, a universally
available cash benefit offering an alternative to pub-
lic day care. In Denmark, municipalities provide
varying levels of benefits (MISSOC 2003). In Fin-
land and Norway, home care allowance is available
to fathers whose youngest child is under 3 years of
age. In Norway, the allowance is graduated into 5
compensation classes determined by reference to the
number of hours that the child spends in day care
(MISSOC 2003). Also Finland has a partial care al-
lowance for working parents of a child under 3 years
of age and for parents of a child attending preschool
or primary school who work shorter hours to look
after their child.
In both Finland and Norway, home care allowances
are used widely, and therefore the share of children
under 3 years of age who are in day care is small. At
the end of 2000, home care allowance was being paid
for 74% of Norwegian children aged 1 or 2 and for
62% of Finnish children. In Norway, the majority
of the children qualified for the full allowance and
thus did not attend public day care at all. In Fin-
land, the partial care allowance has been utilised very
little. Only a little more than 2,000 families were in
receipt of the partial care allowance at the end of
2003. In the autumn of 2004, eligibility for the par-
tial care allowance was extended to the parents of
children attending primary school. (Ellingsæter
2003; RTV 2003.)
4 Institutional differences and incentive
structures explaining the cross-country
variation in the utilisation of benefits
In this section, we shall take a closer look at the struc-
tural differences of the social security systems of the
Nordic countries with particular reference to how
those differences explain the variation in the em-
ployment models and social security utilisation pat-
terns described above. The analysis begins from the
recognition that studies of the incentive structures
of social security systems which focus on a single
country make it difficult to see the significance of
operational principles which have a wider area of
application and which are not prone to change over
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time. A comparative approach, on the other hand,
helps to see how the incentives built into social se-
curity systems influence the behaviour of various
actors, including the insured, employers and pub-
lic authorities. Not only do social actors adjust their
behaviour to the provisions governing social rights,
benefit funding and eligibility control (Olsson et al.
1993), but social security is also constantly adapted
in response to a consultative process between these
actors and the public authorities. Hence, ’institu-
tional incentives’ can equally well be referred to as
’societal regulation by means of social security’.
4.1 Key institutional differences in
operating principles
The pillar framework of social security and
income caps on earnings-related benefits
One of the key differences between the social secur-
ity systems of Finland and those of the other Nor-
dic countries is the fact that in the latter statutory
earnings-related benefits are subject to an income
ceiling, which means that loss of earnings is com-
pensated only to the extent that it does not exceed
this ceiling. Finland applies no such ceilings on in-
come, but the amount of sickness, maternity and
parental allowances does increase on a sliding scale
which results in a relatively lower rate of replace-
ment for those with a higher income. The income
ceiling and the earnings replacement rate together
define the extent to which loss of earnings is cov-
ered by the public system and to what extent by la-
bour market agreements.
Benefits based on labour market agreements are in
European parlance commonly referred to as ”se-
cond-pillar” social security. This includes employ-
er-provided pay3 during sickness, maternity or pa-
rental leave which supplements statutory benefits,
supplementary pensions funded by employers and
collective insurance arrangements based on labour
market agreements. Contractual sick pay is com-
mon in all Nordic countries, as are supplementary
pensions based on labour market agreements (ex-
cept in Finland). In Denmark, however, relatively
few of current pension recipients receive a supple-
mentary pension. The third pillar of social security
is made up of private insurance arrangements,
which are often linked to tax incentives. The third
pillar is not regarded as part of social security, and
the expenditure on third-pillar benefits is not in-
cluded in social expenditure.
The income caps imposed on earnings-related ben-
efits can be seen as one major reason for the differ-
ent way in which the pillar framework of social se-
curity is structured in Finland than it is in the other
Nordic countries. The lower the cap is, the more
demand and the more scope there is in the other
Nordic countries for benefits supplementing the
public provision. All Scandinavian countries apply
income caps in the benefit systems, but only Swe-
den and Norway do so with regard to earnings-re-
lated pensions.
In table 4.1 and figure 4.1, we describe the benefits
provided for loss of earnings from the perspective
of two central factors defining the statutory provi-
sion available, namely the earnings replacement rate
and the income cap on benefits. The highest level
of income protection for persons on a small income
in connection with sickness, maternity and parent-
hood is available in Denmark and Norway, where
all of the loss in earnings is covered for low-income
individuals. In Norway, even those with an average
income enjoy a 100% rate of replacement. This
means that there is no need to supplement the ben-
efit provided during sickness and parental leaves,
and consequently, that employers face no payroll
costs at the lower end of the income scale. The only
exception is the 2–3 weeks at the beginning of a
period of incapacity, which the employer must cov-
er. Hence, in Denmark and in Norway the public
system gives preferential treatment to both low-
wage employees and their employers. The income
cap applied in the Swedish public system is higher
than that applied in Danish system but lower than
in Norway. The earnings replacement rate in Swe-
den has been 77.6% since July 2003. A good one-
third of full-time wage and salary earners in Swe-
den exceed the income cap applicable to sickness
allowances (OECD 2003, 67).
Figure 4.1 shows the gross replacement rate of sick-
ness and parental allowances at various levels of
income. The replacement rate represents the share
that an allowance makes up of the recipient’s gross
3 According to the ESSPROSS manual (Eurostat 1996), expenditure on sick pay
should be counted fully as social expenditure. In an  analysis of social expen-
ditures in the Nordic countries, Finland is the only country where all expendi-
tures on sick pay are included; the corresponding data for Sweden, Norway
and Denmark only include the pay provided during the period which the em-
ployers are required to cover. Pay coinciding with a maternity or parental
leave is not included in the social expenditure of any of the Nordic countries
(www.nom-nos.dk).
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Table 4.1. The sickness, parental and unemployment systems of the Nordic countries: Gross earnings
replacement rates and income caps in 2004.
Figure 4.1. The gross earnings replacement rates of sickness and parental benefits in the Nordic countries,
2004.
Source: Socialförsäkringen i Norden 2004.
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  Finland  Sweden  Norway  Denmark 
Sickness benefits, maternity and 
parental benefits        
        
Gross earnings replacement rate 70  77.6/80.0  100 1 100 
        
Income cap (no benefit available 
for income exceeding this limit), 
€ per month2        . 3 2 670  3 413  1 757 
Unemployment benefits  
  
Gross earnings replacement rate 58 80 4 62.4 90 
  
Income cap (no benefit available 
for income exceeding this limit), 
€ per month     2 082   3 413   1 955 
  
1 For details about how the maternity benefits are scaled according to the length of payment, see table 3.3. 
2 European Central Bank middle rate for 11.8.2004. 
3 The replacement rate is reduced gradually starting from monthly income of € 2,226. 
4 The replacement rate is higher for the first 100 days. 
 
Source: Socialförsäkringen i Norden 2004. 
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earnings. The analysis in figure 4.1 gives an overall
picture of the effect of income caps on the relative
roles of statutory provision and benefits based on
labour market agreements. The earnings replace-
ment rate afforded by the Finnish public system to
those at the bottom of the income scale is the low-
est in all of the Nordic countries. Starting with those
at the middle of the scale, the Finnish replacement
rate exceeds the Danish rate. At the high end of the
income scale, the replacement rates of Finland and
Sweden are roughly the same. It should be noted
that the analysis differs from income distribution
studies which focus on the amount of disposable
income while in receipt of a benefit as a share of
one’s previous net earnings (cf. NOSOSKO 2004,
98).
The target earnings replacement rate of disability
pension is approximately the same in Finland, Swe-
den and Norway, between 60% and 64% (ETK
2002). In Denmark, statutory disability cover is
comprised exclusively of the national pension,
which, following the reform of 2003, is equal to the
maximum unemployment allowance for persons
with no previous income (Sociale ydelser 2004). In
Sweden, income cap on disability pensions is rough-
ly the same as on sickness and parental allowances.
The income cap applied in the Norwegian earnings-
related pension system is higher than its counter-
part in the health insurance system. Any earnings
exceeding the cap are taken into account at one-
third of their value, up to a certain amount (ETK
2002).
Benefit alternatives available to employees
Which benefit an employee will end up on when
faced with different labour market situations and
various personal needs and risks is influenced by a
number of other factors besides the continuity of
and the level of income provided by benefits. First,
eligibility for health-related benefits is largely de-
termined by how medical criteria for eligibility are
defined and how fulfilment of those criteria is con-
trolled. In each of these respects, there are consid-
erable differences between the individual Nordic
countries. We shall return to these differences later.
Employment security and the administrative prac-
tices relating to it influence the choices of both em-
ployers and employees. The strong employment
security seen in Sweden and Norway, in particular,
makes health-related benefits a more viable option,
while the relatively lax redundancy protections in
Denmark, combined with generous unemployment
benefits, channel recipients towards unemployment
benefits. According to an OECD metric, employ-
ment security in Finland is weaker than in Sweden
or Norway but significantly stronger than in Den-
mark (see Madsen 2002).
According to table 4.1, insured persons in all Nor-
dic countries find it more advantageous to draw
health insurance rather than unemployment bene-
fits. This is the case even if we limit the analysis to
statutory benefits. In Sweden and Denmark, the
earnings replacement rates and income caps of sick-
ness and unemployment allowances are quite sim-
ilar, but generous sick pay and (in Sweden) the avail-
ability of collective insurance arrangements make
health insurance a much more attractive option. At
the same time, we must bear in mind that the un-
employment protection system also comprises ben-
efits which supplement the statutory provision,
mainly redundancy benefits of various kinds, which
are based on labour market agreements.
Employer responsibilities
There are significant differences between the Nor-
dic countries in the allocation of financing respon-
sibilities for statutory social security between the
government, employers and insured persons (table
4.2). This difference is most evident in the shares of
social expenditure which are financed with general
revenues as opposed to employer contributions,
whether it be in the form of earmarked taxes or
genuine contributions. The biggest difference in this
regard is seen when comparing Denmark with the
other Nordic countries. Danish employers financed
as little as 10% of the total expenditure on social
security in 2002. In Finland and Sweden, the em-
ployers’ share of financing was roughly four-fold
(39% and 42% respectively). Yet, even though Dan-
ish employers paid such a small share of the social
security expenditure, the unit cost of labour was no
smaller in Denmark than in the other Nordic coun-
tries. According to the EU’s Labour Cost Survey, the
total cost of labour per hour in 2000 was EUR 27 in
Denmark, EUR 29 in Sweden and EUR 22 in Fin-
land. What the high unit cost of labour, combined
with low employer contributions to social security,
presumably means is that the burden of tax-fi-
nanced social security for employees is factored into
the level of wages.
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We may deduce from table 4.2 that differences in
labour costs do not significantly explain the vari-
ation in the level or structure of employment be-
tween the Nordic countries. In this study, I will
therefore concentrate on the incentive structures
influencing employer behaviour, focusing primari-
ly on the share of the absence-related costs borne
by employers.
From the employees’ point of view, it is probably of
no great importance in what proportion the com-
pensation being paid to them is divided between
statutory and contractual benefits. For employers,
however, there is a big difference whether the em-
ployers’ share of the funding of benefits is based on
collective responsibility, paid individually out of
each employer’s own funds, or organised on the
basis of contingency insurance. The principal rule
is that statutory provision is funded collectively,
which in practice can mean a funding method based
on the collection of premiums or tax-like payments,
or on appropriations from general tax revenues. Yet
there is at least an attempt in Finland and Sweden
to strengthen the insurance basis of the statutory
systems, i.e., to increase their transparency by ac-
centuating the link between contributions and ben-
efits (SOU 2002; STM 2002). Continued pay dur-
ing sickness absences and maternity leaves provid-
ed at the same time as statutory benefits is natural-
ly funded entirely by the employer, as are many of
the supplementary pensions topping up the statu-
tory pensions. Benefits based entirely on contingen-
cy insurance include collective life and health in-
surance arrangements for employees.
In discussing the supplementary benefits funded
entirely by the employer, we must make a clear dis-
tinction between benefits based on labour market
agreement and benefits based on statutory liabilities
imposing direct costs on the employer. Benefits based
on labour market agreements are, for the employ-
er, not only a cost factor but also a conscious deci-
sion by the enterprise or sector of industry to in-
vest in the well-being of the workforce and thereby
promote economic performance and gain an ad-
vantage in the competition for good employees. By
contrast, the payments which employers are under
the statutory provision required to make while the
Table 4.2. Indicators of social expenditure and the financing of social security in the EU and the Nordic
countries.
Sources: NOSOSKO 2004, tables 10.4, 10.5, 10.9; European Communities 2003.
 
 
     
  Finland Sweden Norway Denmark 
     
Social expenditure as % of GDP (2002) 26.4 32.5 26.5 30.0 
     
Social expenditure per capita, €     
adjusted for purchasing power parity (2001) 5 785 7 951 8 183 7 809 
     
Financing of social expenditure     
by source (2002), % 100 100 100 100 
General revenue 43 47 58 62 
Employers 39 42 26 10 
Insured 11 9 14 22 
Other 7 2 1 6 
     
Total labour costs, 
€ per hour worked in the  
private sector (2000) 22.13 28.56 .. 27.10 
Of which (%):    
Total social security contributions paid by the 
employers 20.5 29.6 .. 8.0 
Statutory social insurance contributions 18.3 22.0 .. 1.0 
Contractual social insurance contributions 0.5 6.3 .. 6.7 
Other staff-related costs 1.7 1.3 .. 0.3 
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employee completes a specified waiting period are
intended to prevent overuse of the benefit. The most
typical example of such payments is the sick pay
which employers in all the Nordic countries must
provide during the first 2–3 weeks of a sickness ab-
sence. Other examples include the requirement on
Danish employers to pay unemployment benefit for
the first two days of unemployment, or the poten-
tially substantial costs which Finnish employers –
depending on the size of the enterprise or the
number of employees – may incur in respect of dis-
ability and unemployment pensions.
In both Finland and Sweden, there have lately been
discussions about statutory requirements on em-
ployers to pay continued wages during sickness or
parental leave and to some extent also about the
benefits based on labour market agreements. There
was intense debate in Sweden about extending the
statutory employer-covered period in connection
with sickness absences, because such a move was
feared to make employers less inclined to hire new
employees (SOU 2002). In Finland, this question is
closely linked to attempts to increase employment
in labour-intensive sectors by such measures as
improving the possibilities of persons with a weak
labour market position to find and retain work. The
potential cost that the employer may incur in con-
nection with maternity or with temporary or per-
manent incapacity for work can be a major obsta-
cle not only to the employment of those who are at
particular ”risk” for such events, but also more
broadly to promoting the employment of particular
groups of workers. This can lead to distortions that
are detrimental to both individuals and the greater
good of the labour market in so far as those at par-
ticular ”risk” are marginalised because of certain
collective features and are not judged on the basis
of their personal abilities or social skills (e.g. Jans-
son et al. 2003).
4.2 Disability benefits: the integration of
persons with functional limitations,
restrictions on benefit utilisation and
obstacles to employment
Partial benefits and their effect on employment
participation and benefit utilisation
The fact that partial benefits are used as widely as
they are in Sweden and Norway raises the question,
to what extent are the partial benefits available in
the Scandinavian countries an instrument designed
to support the employment of workers with func-
tional limitations and to what extent are they a re-
sponse to other needs for flexible work arrange-
ments felt by employees or employers. How fine a
distinction is it possible draw between different de-
grees of disability based purely on medical criteria?
Assuming that the partial benefits provided for par-
tial disability serve their intended purpose, they do
at least provide a source of subsidy for both em-
ployers and employees.
The partial benefits which exist in the Scandinavian
countries, as well as the assessment of partial dis-
ability, are based on different principles than those
applied in Finland. In the Scandinavian countries,
the main principle is to allow those with functional
limitations to make the most of their remaining
work capacity. Also in Finland, the emphasis has in
the last 10 years been on the remaining work ca-
pacity rather than on incapacity for work. However,
the only kind of sickness absence available to sick-
ness allowance recipients is a full-time absence. In
the case of disability pensions, only one category of
part-time absence is available (in addition to full-
time pensions).
In Sweden and Norway, the partial sickness allow-
ance and the partial disability pension can be seen
as benefits subsidising employment which are not
as stigmatising as the various ”in-work-benefits”
aimed at supplementing incomes or activating un-
employed persons that are available in other coun-
tries (cf. STM 2002, 90–94). For example, it has been
found that in Sweden recipients of partial benefits
are often female municipal employees with an im-
migrant background. Partial sickness allowance may
also be a convenient pathway to retirement for el-
derly and chronically ill people (SOU 2002; Hem-
mingsson 2004). For employers, a partial benefit
may be a flexible way to retain functionally limited
employees that may come in particularly handy
when labour is in short supply.
The Norwegian partial benefit can partly be seen as
a form direct subsidy to employers. This feature is
particularly prominent in cases where an employee’s
work input is reduced due to illness although the
employee works full-time. Such features can also
be seen in the aktiv sykmelding (active sick leave)
available in Norway. Under this arrangement, em-
ployees can achieve reintegration into their place
of work while drawing a benefit payable to low- and
middle-income individuals at a rate of 100% of
earnings. This allows employers to retain for 12
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weeks, at no cost to themselves, a worker whose in-
put, while reduced by functional limitations, is most
likely significantly above zero. In 2001, active sick
leaves were taken by about 37,000 persons, most of
whom received a partial benefit combined with
part-time employment (RTV 2003, 61).
Following the reform enacted in 2003, the Danish
pension system no longer provides any possibility
to receive a partial pension. The new Danish sys-
tem appears to be unique in Europe in taking full
advantage of the remaining work capacity of those
who have some left under normal terms of employ-
ment. This means that people are not compensated
for partial loss of their capacity for work but are
paid a full or nearly full compensation for continu-
ing to work at a level appropriate to their functional
limitations. Municipalities are required to find a
suitable flexjob for persons whose work capacity has
been permanently reduced. Workers are paid at least
the applicable wage specified by the collective agree-
ment regardless of their work input. Half or two-
thirds of the wage is paid back to the employer by
the municipality. If we examine this arrangement
from the employer’s perspective, the additional
wage cost incurred by the employer in the form of
a top-up to the minimum wage is by and large com-
mensurate with the worker’s productivity and thus
creates no significant additional cost burden for the
employer.
Seeking to increase the work input of benefit
recipients
The Scandinavian countries currently share a ten-
dency of creating active labour market alternatives
to early retirement pensions and benefits. In Swe-
den and Norway, the goal has been to increase the
utilisation of partial benefits at the expense of full-
time absence, and to bring out a greater work input
from those in receipt of partial benefits. Amend-
ment of the provisions governing sickness absences
was under review in Sweden, with the proposal be-
ing to make partial benefits the primary option right
from the onset of work incapacity (Eklund et al.
2004), but the amendment was abandoned. (In
2005, a law amendment was introduced in which
the partial allowances were given primacy by mak-
ing part-time benefits more attractive in terms of
the direct costs incurred by the employer.) In Nor-
way, a similar amendment was implemented by an
act which became effective in July 2004. Norway has
also had some success in increasing the employment
participation of those receiving a partial disability
pension (RTV 2003). Denmark has taken the great-
est strides in using activation measures as an alter-
native to disability pensions, thanks to such meas-
ures as the introduction of the flexjob, which was
referred to above. Using the remaining work capa-
city of a worker has not remained merely wishful
thinking but has been adopted as an operative prin-
ciple while managing to maintain a distinctively
Danish high level of provision.
The ability to combine activation measures and full
or part-time benefits in a variety of different ways,
which is available in all of the Nordic countries ex-
cept Finland, points up the degree to which the
Finnish system is still mired in categorical either/or
thinking when it comes to employment participa-
tion and absence from work. Also in Finland, re-
garding the assessment of work disability, steps were
taken as early as the mid-1990s to prioritise the re-
maining work capacity over incapacity for work, and
to stress the primary role of rehabilitation (when
the temporary disability pension was recreated as
the rehabilitation subsidy). However, these steps
have had little practical effect, among other reasons
because work suitable for a person with a reduced
work capacity has not been available or the benefit
system has not been geared towards supporting the
part-time employment of persons with functional
limitations.
Improvements in administrative practices and
eligibility controls
Sweden has in recent years dedicated particular at-
tention to improving the administrative practices
relating to the claims for health-related benefits,
strengthening the links between decision-makers
and providers of funding, and ensuring the uniform
treatment of all clients. In a four-country compari-
son of Germany, Finland, Sweden and the Nether-
lands (RFV 2003a), a group of Swedish researchers
found that Sweden does not have a comprehensive,
nationally applied set of administrative guidelines
or controls relating to the evaluation of work inca-
pacity. As a major shortcoming of the Swedish sys-
tem, they identify the rudimentary nature of the
occupational health care system and its virtual lack
of involvement in sick leave decisions, the moni-
toring of health and the initiation of the rehabilit-
ation process. On all of these measures, the resear-
chers give high marks to the Finnish and German
systems.
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Following a spate of official reports and studies,
Sweden launched a series of reforms aimed at cut-
ting the incidence of sickness absences to half by
2008. Administrative practices have been stream-
lined by merging the National Social Insurance
Board and the local Social Security Offices into a
single organisation similar to the way the Finnish
Social Insurance Institution is administered. Swe-
den is also aiming to strengthen the guidance role
of local insurance doctors (again, similarly to Fin-
land) and to achieve greater public insight into the
information on sickness absences by requiring en-
terprises to make such information public in a spe-
cial statement of human resources.
In Denmark, authority for decision-making and
implementation has been increasingly delegated to
the municipalities while organising the administra-
tion on the basis of performance management. A
number of reforms were carried out during the last
10 years, introducing a single-window approach to
the benefit provision. The municipalities also carry
financial responsibility for the payment of benefits.
The ultimate cost to the municipality depends on
the emphasis the municipality places on active
measures as opposed to passive ones, which is com-
pared to the performance of all Danish municipal-
ities. According to Einar Øverbye (2004), these steps
have meant a shift from substantial social rights to
procedural social rights, whereby insured persons
are entitled to a solution to their problems, but the
authorities will determine, in consultation with the
insured person, by means of which benefit or pro-
cedure this right is realised. This creates extra work
for Danish employers, because they must interact
separately with each municipality in which their
employees live. (Analyse af det danske sygefravær
2003, 38.)
Generally speaking, there seems to be little danger
that expenditure on health-related benefits will in-
crease uncontrollably in Finland. The utilisation of
benefits is controlled by such factors as the central
role of occupational health care and the clear divi-
sion of duties between a decentralised eligibility
determination system and centralised guidance and
supervision practices. The use of sickness allowances
is also restrained by a centralised system of eligibil-
ity determination for disability pensions, which has
a feedback effect on decisions concerning eligibility
for the benefits preceding the disability pension.
Employer responsibilities and disincentives to
employment
All of the sickness allowance systems of the Nordic
countries, with the exception of Finland’s, have been
designed to accommodate for the fact that requir-
ing the employer to provide sick pay at the beginning
of each period of incapacity can lead to indirect dis-
crimination in hiring against chronically ill persons.
Special high-cost protections (högriskskydd) have
therefore been built into the systems, which makes
it possible to exempt an employer from the respon-
sibility to provide sick pay provided the employee
can present a certificate from the social insurance
authority attesting to a chronic illness which is con-
sidered to pose a significant risk for repeated sick-
ness absence. The insured person must apply for
this protection from the relevant authorities. The
employer receives sickness allowance as compensa-
tion for sick pay during the initial period of inca-
pacity for work. In 2002, this provision was applied
to about 7,000 insured persons in Sweden and to
about 12,000 insured persons in Denmark (DST
2003b; www.rfv.se).
The Danish system also accounts for the risk of par-
ticularly high rates of unforeseeable sickness absen-
teeism affecting specific small employers, who can
opt for a voluntary insurance against the costs aris-
ing from the initial two-week period of employer-
provided pay. In 2002, compensations under this
voluntary insurance arrangement were paid for
about 116,000 periods of incapacity (DST 2003a),
of which the majority were short absences of under
two weeks. A one-day waiting period was intro-
duced in 2004 (ADIR 2004). Sweden has also had a
similar voluntary insurance option for small em-
ployers, but due to a high contribution rate, it has
not been popular (Socialdepartement, oral commu-
nication). The possibility of introducing easier
terms of insurance and thereby making the option
more popular is currently under review.
In all of the Nordic countries, public-sector em-
ployees are entitled to the longest period of sick pay.
In Denmark and Norway, public-sector employees
are paid the difference between their pay and the
sickness allowance as long as they remain on sick
leave. In Sweden, public-sector employers provide
up to 80% of pay even on earnings exceeding the
earnings cap. In the Finnish public sector, employees
are on full pay for the first two months and on 75%
of pay for the following few months.
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Particularly interesting from the perspective of this
study are the contractual obligations concerning sick
pay in the private sector in general and in the la-
bour-intensive low-wage industries in particular. To
start with, it should be noted that the sickness al-
lowance provides full compensation for loss of earn-
ings for low-income workers (in Denmark) and
low- and middle-income workers (in Norway). Ac-
cording to NOSOSKO (2004), in Denmark’s private
sector, sickness allowances for salary earners are
normally topped up to 100% of pay, while wage
earners usually receive full wages or a certain maxi-
mum share of full wages for four weeks. In Norway,
sick pay is not very common in the private sector,
apparently because of the principle of full compen-
sation up to a relatively high level of earnings ap-
plied in the statutory provision system. In Sweden,
employers pay 10% of the regular pay on top of the
sickness allowance for three months following the
sick pay period, which brings the total rate of re-
placement up to 87.6 percent. This compensation
is also provided for the part of pay exceeding the
earnings cap. The benefits provided under labour
market agreements are somewhat more generous
for salary earners than wage earners. This deficit is
made up to some extent by a collective health in-
surance arrangement for private-sector wage earn-
ers. In Finland, private-sector employers usually
provide sick pay for 1–3 months. The median dur-
ation in the manufacturing and service sectors is
about six weeks.
In conclusion, when sickness allowances, contrac-
tual pay and insurance compensations are all taken
into account, Finnish wage and salary earners have
the lowest level of income security. One exception to
this are the relatively high-income employees in the
Danish private sector, whose total level of provision
may towards the end of the sick leave drop below
the Finnish level. Private-sector employers in Fin-
land, however, pay a relatively higher proportion of
their employees’ income security during incapacity,
especially in the low-wage sectors, than private-sec-
tor employers in the other Nordic countries (see also
Hytti 2006). The reason for this is not that the level
of contractual provision is high but that the differ-
ence between sick pay and the level of statutory pro-
vision is higher in Finland than in other Nordic
countries due to the comparatively low level of sta-
tutory provision available to low-income workers.
4.3 Incentives affecting the employment
status of aging workers
Economic incentives for employees
In the foregoing, we noted that there are no major
differences in the level of statutory pensions between
Finland, Sweden and Norway. Hence, there is also
no great variation between these three countries in
the economic incentives for retirement. However, a
different picture emerges if we include in the ana-
lysis the contractual supplementary pensions com-
mon in Sweden and Norway but rare in Finland. In
Sweden, these pensions cover about 90% of wage
and salary earners, compared to 40–60% of Nor-
wegian private-sector employees. In both countries,
the contractual pensions have been funded entirely
by the employers. The pensions are also provided
on the same scale of partial disability as statutory
benefits. (ETK 2002.)
A high level of contractual provision supplement-
ing the statutory disability pension cover is un-
doubtedly an important incentive for Swedish and
Norwegian employees to seek retirement on a dis-
ability pension. In Finland, the level of provision
will typically be lower due to the lack of similar sup-
plementary provision and consequently smaller
economic incentives. In Denmark, the full disabil-
ity pension is equal to the maximum unemploy-
ment allowance. Retirement earnings decrease the
pension, which probably makes flexjob nearly always
more advantageous financially compared to a situ-
ation where a pensioner has small incidental earn-
ings. On the other hand, economic incentives can-
not have a huge impact in Denmark, because dis-
ability pension is only available to persons with no
remaining capacity for work and is subject to an
extremely stringent activation and rehabilitation
process. This gives activation a secondary role of
controlling the utilisation of benefits.
While economic incentives no doubt contribute to
temporary or permanent retirement on disability
benefits in both Sweden and Norway, we should not
conclude from this that the high level of benefits is
the ultimate reason behind retirement. Rather, the
salient point is the availability of different benefit
options, which is largely the result of deliberate
policy choices. Welfare incentives have been de-
signed to be compatible with the ”commitment to
full employment” adopted in both Sweden and
Norway, and therefore unemployment benefits are
not the principal means of adjustment to labour
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market problems. In Finland, the mechanisms gov-
erning the use of benefits have to a large extent
worked to the opposite effect, which has resulted in
thousands of persons being listed as long-term un-
employed, who, in light of their health and func-
tional capacity, would be entitled to a disability pen-
sion.
Employer incentives and experience rating
In Sweden, contractual benefits have been increas-
ingly used to cut workforces in the same manner as
the Finnish unemployment pension. The cost to the
employer is 40% lower than the preceding wage or
salary, and the employer can also sidestep the se-
niority provisions of the strict Swedish employment
protection legislation. In 1999, contractual arrange-
ments were the primary source of income for near-
ly a fourth of the 60 to 64-year-olds who left the
labour market. Some of the differences of these con-
tractual arrangements to the Finnish unemploy-
ment pension are that they are taken up more by
salary and higher-income earners (OECD 2003, 74)
and that a contractual pension does not preclude
employment in a new employment relationship
(NOSOSKO 1999).
Finland is the only Nordic country applying em-
ployer-specific experience rating in its statutory
pension system. Experience rating is applied in the
disability and unemployment pension systems
(both in the public and private sectors). Arguments
have been presented both in favour and against the
employment incentive effect of this practice. A
working group on employment appointed by the
Finnish Government (VNK 2003) took the view that
experience rating in connection with disability pen-
sions makes it more difficult for workers at a great
risk for disability, such as ageing workers or those
with functional limitations, to find employment.
The working group also argued that high experi-
ence-rated payments for disability pensions are in
conflict with the principle of causation, according
to which payments should be reduced when an en-
terprise has little ability to influence the likelihood
that a certain risk will be realised. On the other hand,
it has also been suggested that experience rating can
act as a motivating factor for employers to invest in
the maintenance of health and work capacity and
in the rehabilitation of their workforce, and to ad-
just workplace assignments to functionally limited
workers’ abilities (ETK 2003).
A private-sector employer with a staff of 50 or more
(which in Finland is considered to be large employ-
er) pays a share of the capital value of disability and
unemployment pensions from the beginning of the
pension period to the old-age retirement age, which
increases with the size of the firm. For employers
with a staff of 50, the share is equal to zero, rising to
80% in firms with a staff of 800 or more. The em-
ployer share only applies to companies operating
under the Employees’ Pensions Act and to certain
pension funds (ETK 2003; Lindell 2004). In the pen-
sion system for municipal employees, this arrange-
ment is more analogous to the principle of caus-
ation, with a 60% share of pension funding being
applied to unemployment pensions but a 20% share
to disability pensions (Tiilikka 2004). The rules for
state employees resemble those for private-sector
employees, but the payments only apply to hypo-
thetical future pensionable earnings calculated from
the date of the pension contingency (Kostiainen
2003). The pension reform enacted in 2005 changed
the technical aspects of this system to some extent.
A large percentage of the workers are employed with
companies or organisations that are required to
make contributions towards pension costs. In the
private-sector, nearly one third of insured persons
were employed in organisations (with a staff of 200
or more) required to make a significant contribu-
tion to pension costs. Municipal employees are near-
ly all covered under these provisions, but the dis-
ability cost burden for the employers is smaller (Tii-
likka 2004). No data is available on coverage among
state employees, but considering the typically large
staff numbers at state workplaces, the coverage is
likely quite high.
In the Finnish debate, particular attention has been
drawn to the disincentive effect that experience rat-
ing is alleged to have on the hiring of ageing work-
ers. Some steps have in fact been taken to decrease
the risk incurred by an employer hiring a worker
who is over 50 years of age by introducing special
provisions covering cases where a worker becomes
disabled within three years of hiring (Lindell 2004).
The potential cost to the employer for hiring a
younger person with a high risk of disability has
received little attention, even though the younger
the person is, the greater the cost will be, should the
risk be realised. There is a gaping difference between
the thinking in Finland and in the Scandinavian
countries when one considers that the latter have
seen it necessary to exempt employers from the 2–3
week employer-covered period in connection with
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sickness allowances provided they hire a chronical-
ly ill person prone to recurring absence from work.
In Finland, employers may have to pay 80% of the
capital value of the pension until the recipient reach-
es the old-age retirement age, which may be several
decades away.
Along with the employer-covered benefit period,
another factor that has been considered to result in
discrimination in hiring for ageing workers is the
practice of levying a pension contribution that in-
creases with age. In Finland, this practice will be
largely discontinued with the pension reform of
2005, although the basic contribution levied from
employers subject to experience rating will remain
to some extent age-dependent (Lindell 2004). In
Sweden, the supplementary pensions based on la-
bour market agreements are funded with contri-
butions linked to age. The contributions for the old-
est workers can be quite substantial (OECD 2003).
4.4 Some differences in incentive
structures of the unemployment
protection systems
In Finland, the incentive question of social security
has been examined mainly from the labour supply
perspective, which has directed the attention to the
incentives of the unemployed to accept work. From
this perspective, the most relevant income transfer
mechanisms are unemployment benefits and other
supplementary transfers such as housing benefits
and income support (Parpo 2004). A number of
changes have been made to these benefits in the last
decade in order to increase their incentive effect,
but these changes have also had the effect of weak-
ening the income security of those who have not
managed to find employment (VNK 2001, 10). Ac-
cording to calculations comparing households,
those receiving minimum benefits are most likely
to face incentive traps. Receiving minimum bene-
fits from different sources, each applying separate
means testing, combined with taxes and service
charges, may create situations where it makes finan-
cial sense not to accept an offer for short-term em-
ployment (Viitamäki 2001; STM 2002). We may
presume that the systems of the other Nordic coun-
tries contain fewer such incentive traps, since there
is less means testing on the whole. However, the tax
wedge effect may be greater in the other Nordic
countries than in Finland, which could partly ex-
plain such phenomena as the greater prevalence of
part-time work in the Scandinavian countries (cf.
Freeman et al. 1995).
An interesting point to note in the Danish incentiv-
isation practice is that the combined length of the
earnings-related unemployment allowance and
earnings-related activation benefits is a standard 4
years irrespective of the timing of the activation
measures. In Finland, the eligibility end point is
moved forward when a person participates in acti-
vation measures. In Denmark, training and educa-
tion can thus be geared to the unemployed person’s
long-term needs, compared to Finland, where the
decision to implement activation measures often
measured to the desire of the unemployed person
or of the local authorities to delay the end of the
earnings-related unemployment benefits (Bred-
gaard et al. 2003).
Two major differences between Finland and the rest
of the Nordic countries are that nearly a half of the
unemployed rely on the means-tested labour mar-
ket subsidy for their subsistence (Vakuutusvalvon-
ta and Kela 2004), and that the activation rate among
the unemployed is significantly lower than in Swe-
den or Denmark (Työministeriö 2003). Despite the
dismantling of the incentive traps associated with
the minimum benefits, a total of 165,000 persons
were in receipt of the labour market subsidy as of
April 2004, which is equivalent to about 5% of the
working-age population. Over a period of five years,
the number of persons in receipt of the labour mar-
ket subsidy had decreased by no more than 7,700
(4.4%), and this decrease was due almost entirely
to transition into retirement facilitated by the pub-
lic authorities (through such measures as the screen-
ing of the long-term unemployed for their remain-
ing capacity for work). Indeed, it is difficult to see,
at the macro level, any significant decrease in the
number of unemployed persons subsisting on mini-
mum benefits that could be attributed to the elim-
ination of the incentive traps.
4.5 The employment effect of family
benefits
Like other income security benefits, family benefits
impact the functioning of the labour market via
institutional incentives and disincentives targeting
both the insured and the employers. International
studies have shown female employment participa-
tion to have a strong positive correlation both with
fertility rates and the resources allocated to the as-
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sistance of families. In all of the Nordic countries,
long family leaves and comprehensive day care ser-
vices promote female employment participation,
even as the care services, being provided by public
organisations, create employment opportunities in
the public sector.
Home care allowance and its influence on
labour force participation
Finland diverges from the other Nordic countries
especially in that parental benefits are less flexible
and afford less room for individual freedom of
choice. Another difference can be seen in the fact
that the Finnish system provides a strong incentive
to the home care of small children while ensuring
that all parents of children under school age enjoy
a strictly defined subjective right to municipal day
care services. Typically employed full-time, Finnish
women usually leave the work force altogether af-
ter the parental leave is over to look after their child
while receiving the home care allowance, whereas
Norwegian women, typically employed part-time
to begin with, maintain a foothold in the labour
force (Baklien et al. 2001). Long-term recipiency of
the Finnish home care allowance also seems to pose
a risk of marginalisation from the labour market,
because the incidence of long care leaves is higher
than average among young mothers with a low
level of educational attainment, who often have no
job to which they can return (Lammi-Taskula 2004).
Disincentives to employment faced by women
of childbearing age
There has been a lively debate in Finland concern-
ing the direct cost of childbirth and child care in-
curred by service-sector employers with a large fe-
male workforce. However, detailed analyses of the
costs and their possible disincentive effect on female
employment are not available. According to the
service employers (Palvelutyönantajat 2003 and
2004), important cost factors include the sick leaves
taken during the pregnancy, the hiring and train-
ing of substitutes, the paid holiday time and holi-
day pay accruing during the maternity leave (some
of the cost of which is compensated to the em-
ployer), and the maternity pay which may have to
be provided under collective bargaining agreements.
At the same time, it should be noted that such col-
lectively bargained pay is not available at all in the
lowest-wage, most labour-intensive sectors, such as
commerce, cleaning, facilities management or
hotel and catering.
It is difficult to produce a clear comparison to see
whether Finnish employers must cover more costs
relating to childbirth and child care than employers
in the other Nordic countries. We are not aware that
the other Nordic countries would have an arrange-
ment similar to the Finnish practice of compensat-
ing employers for the costs of annual leaves. In oth-
er respects, it may be presumed that the total em-
ployer cost of maternity and parental leaves and the
care of sick children may be somewhat smaller in
the other Nordic countries than in Finland. This
assumption is supported by the presence of the full
compensation principle in the statutory provision
systems of Denmark and Norway, the statutory
compensations provided in Sweden and Norway for
the temporary care of a sick child, and the higher
level of statutory cover available in the Scandinavi-
an countries for sickness absences during pregnancy.
In Denmark, the risk that small employers may face
when it comes to the accumulation of sickness leaves
during the pregnancy is mitigated by the availabil-
ity of a voluntary insurance arrangement covering
the period in which the employer is responsible for
providing sick pay (see section 4.2).
5 Summary and conclusions
5.1 Objective
This study set out to examine the differences be-
tween the ”employment and income security mod-
els” of Finland and of the other Nordic countries.
The objective was to describe such differences in
greater detail and to discover how the institutional
differences in the individual countries’ income se-
curity systems can help to explain the observed dif-
ferences in employment. Particular attention was
paid to the structural elements of social security
which relate to the possibility of ageing workers to
continue working and to combine flexibly paid
employment with income security benefits, and to
the employment thresholds facing persons whose
position in the labour market is weak. The starting
hypothesis was that by comparing the Nordic coun-
tries with respect to the ”institutional logic” of the
social security systems, we might identify such in-
centives for the use of income security benefits
which would not emerge in a study focusing on a
single country.
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5.2 Participation in paid work and social
security utilisation in the Nordic
countries
If the goal is assumed to be a high rate of employ-
ment combined with a long working career and a
relatively high rate of work input measured in the
number of hours worked, Denmark comes out as
the winner in this Nordic comparison (excluding
Iceland). In Denmark, the employment rate (75.1%
in 2003) and the total employment life expectancy
(38 years) are both at the same level as in Norway.
However, the Danes have a greater involvement in
working life, as shown by the number of hours
worked per employee (1,637 hours as opposed to
1,524 hours). On the other hand, Denmark looks
more vulnerable to adverse developments in the
employment rate because of the larger presence of
young workers, especially students, in the employed
population. The utilisation of income security ben-
efits in Denmark is difficult to compare to other
Nordic countries, because the system is structured
differently. Taking the broadest view, the number
of recipients of benefits and participants in active
labour market measures was second only to Fin-
land. A distinctive feature in Denmark is the high
level of income security combined with stringent
activation rules, which is also quite effective in lim-
iting overutilisation of the benefits.
Norway has the lowest number of hours worked of
all Nordic countries, a high employment rate and
long working careers. The first finding is explained
by the high rate of part-time employment among
women. At the same time, Norwegians of working
age use income security benefits less than their
counterparts in the other Nordic countries when
the number of recipients is compared to the total
population. The income security benefits that are
provided are nearly exclusively related to illness, and
consequently Norwegians have the highest rate of
utilisation of health-related benefits.
In Sweden, the employment rate is close to the level
of the other Scandinavian countries (72.9%), but
there is more slack in it because the absenteeism
rate of the Swedish workforce is the highest in the
Nordic countries. According to a labour force sur-
vey, the share of workers absent for the entire sur-
vey week (including holidays) was 17.1%, compared
to 13.2% in Denmark and 14.5% in Finland. The
employment rate among ageing workers was higher
in Sweden than in any other EU country, but here,
too, we must take into account that the effective
employment rate is substantially lower. Health-re-
lated income security benefits were used a little less
than in Norway but significantly more than in Fin-
land. Conversely, Swedes were more than twice as
likely to be unemployed or participating in activa-
tion measures as Norwegians, but about half as likely
as Finns.
Finland stood out the most in terms of the employ-
ment rate and the utilisation of income security
benefits. To simplify a bit, one can say that Finnish
workers are either employed full-time or not at all
(being unemployed or outside the labour force).
This point is highlighted both by the total employ-
ment life expectancy, which is lower in Finland than
in any other Nordic country (32.5 years for men
and 31.6 years for women), and by the number of
hours worked per employed person, which is the
highest in the Nordic countries (1,682 hours per
year). The number one problem in Finland is un-
employment and the resulting high rate of utilisa-
tion of income security benefits and activation
measures (about 12.6%). On the other hand, there
are far fewer recipients of health-related benefits.
Less than 10% of working-age Finns received sick-
ness and rehabilitation allowances or disability pen-
sions, compared to more than 13% of working-age
Swedes and 15% of working-age Norwegians.
The difference in the distribution of paid work be-
tween Finland and the Nordic countries is exem-
plified by a calculation which illustrates how much
the number of persons in paid employment would
increase in Finland if the number of hours worked
were divided per employed person in the same way
as it is in the other Nordic countries. If adjusted to
the Swedish figures, the Finnish employment rate
would climb by 4 percentage points, and if adjust-
ed to the Norwegian figures, by 7 percentage points,
which would practically wipe out the difference in
the employment rates. An adjustment to the Dan-
ish figures, however, would only produce an increase
of 2 percentage points in the Finnish employment
rate.
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5.3 Which factors relating to the income
security systems of the Scandinavian
countries reinforce a high rate of
employment?
Flexible combining of work and benefits
Nearly all Scandinavian countries allow workers to
combine work and benefits flexibly by decreasing
or increasing the number of hours worked. In terms
of family benefits, this means individual freedom
of choice in the timing of family leaves. In Finland,
similar flexibility features have been introduced cau-
tiously.
The ability to combine work and benefits flexibly,
which is inherent in all of the Scandinavian benefit
systems, bespeaks of the totally different philoso-
phy behind the systems when compared to the Finn-
ish systems. In Finland, full-time transition from
work to benefit recipiency or vice versa is still the
prevailing idea even if there have been some legis-
lative changes which have broadened the range of
part-time benefit options. The other Nordic coun-
tries focus much more on boosting the work input
and increasing the number of hours worked as op-
posed to raising the number of workers. It is diffi-
cult to say what impact a substantial increase in the
availability of various partial benefits and the addi-
tion of individual freedom of choice would have in
Finland, where full-time employment is the norm.
However, it is likely that injecting greater flexibility
into the income security system would bring about
greater flexibility also in the labour market.
Incentives vs. control
The level of income security is lower in Finland
nearly across the board than it is in the other Nor-
dic countries. In the case of health-related benefits,
this is partially due to a virtual lack of contractual
supplementary benefits. In Sweden and Norway, for
instance, the generous level of statutory and sup-
plementary pensions is no doubt produces a major
incentive to the conceptualisation of labour mar-
ket problems in medical terms. Health-related ben-
efits are also in Finland usually a better deal for the
insured than unemployment benefits, but the high-
ly-effective controls on benefit recipiency have pre-
vented their overutilisation. Yet at the same time,
Finland lacks mechanisms that would help unem-
ployed persons with functional limitations to receive
the treatment and rehabilitation they need in time.
In Denmark, overutilisation of health-related ben-
efits is checked by an incentive structure which
makes it financially advantageous also for the local
authorities providing the benefits to refer people
primarily to activation measures. From the insured
person’s point of view, the criteria for disability pen-
sions are very strict specifically because of the pri-
ority accorded to activation measures. Rather than
being just encouraged to work, persons with func-
tional limitations are in effect being required to
work, with everyone except those with no remain-
ing work capacity being offered at least a flexjob. The
Danes’ generous approach to the level of income
security is reflected in the fact that flexjob workers
are paid the prevailing industry wage, at least half
of which is refunded to the employer from general
revenues.
Supporting those disadvantaged in the labour
market
There is a structural difference between the Finn-
ish social security system and those of the other
Nordic countries in how the responsibility for the
income security of those with the smallest wage or
salaried incomes is divided between society and the
labour market, and in how this division of respon-
sibilities impacts on the employment and employ-
ability of low-wage individuals and persons at a
great risk of absenteeism or social marginalisation.
The greater burden of responsibility assumed by
society for the income security of low-wage indi-
viduals in the other Nordic countries results indi-
rectly in subsidisation of the low-wage sectors of
industry which often have a predominantly female
workforce.
There are two different ways in which the other
Nordic countries provide more support than Fin-
land to those with a weak labour market position.
First, the high or even full rate of compensation
provided when the recipient’s income does not ex-
ceed the income cap usually ensures that employers
are not exposed to major financial risk should they
hire workers who have some health limitations or
who are in their prime childbearing years. The
other Nordic countries have also enacted special
high-cost protections for employers hiring a chronic-
ally ill person, which ensures that they will not be
liable for statutory sick pay as the worker, if inca-
pacitated because of the illness to which the pro-
tection pertains, completes the waiting period for
sickness allowance. This approach has particular
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relevance to the current debate in Finland dealing
with the possible employment disincentives of the
experience rating applied in the Finnish earnings-
related pension system. Denmark also has in place
an effective voluntary insurance arrangement pro-
tecting small employers from outsize risk of high
sickness leave costs.
Institutional structures favouring those in the weak-
est labour market position is also seen clearly in the
Nordic countries’ unemployment protection sys-
tems in that the unemployed do not lose their right
to earnings-related benefits and have to go on
means-tested benefits as easily as they do in Fin-
land. Ensuring that the unemployed have adequate
income security and participate in activation meas-
ures while in receipt of earnings-related benefits
helps to prevent marginalisation and promotes their
employability. On the other hand, the strict activa-
tion rules in Sweden seem to have brought about a
situation where the long-term unemployed often
seek sickness allowance as soon as they have ex-
hausted their eligibility for unemployment bene-
fits. Denmark has managed to avoid this effect be-
cause activation is applied equally rigorously to sick-
ness allowances as it is to unemployment benefits.
The possibility to use one’s remaining capacity
for work
One of the major differences between Finland on
the one hand and Sweden and Norway on the other
is that the latter two countries seek to integrate per-
sons with functional limitations into the labour
market with the help of partial disability benefits.
In Finland, a partial disability benefit does not exist
and partial disability pensions are used much less.
The widespread use of partial disability benefits in
Sweden and Norway probably also increases the
overall use of health-related benefits. On the other
hand, it is possible and even likely that the partial
disability benefits decrease the overall use of health-
related benefits and/or labour market benefits. In
Finland, persons with functional limitations are
probably more likely to become long-term unem-
ployed, which may expose them to further deterior-
ation of their health and working capacity.
The widespread use of sickness allowances and the
medicalisation of labour market problems in Swe-
den and Norway have been criticised both domes-
tically and internationally. However, there is a good
argument to be made for a partial disability benefit
which is available, under appropriate restrictions,
to those with functional limitations, especially con-
sidering the widely accepted need to improve em-
ployment possibilities for those disadvantaged in
the labour market. Graduated according to the de-
gree of work capacity, such assistance by definition
supports the employment of persons whose quali-
fications are not sufficient for them to participate
fully in paid employment. If the assistance holds
advantages also for the employer, it can ideally help
to make better use of the remaining work capacity,
prevent hasty decisions about retirement and sup-
port the continued employment of especially age-
ing workers. Also, such assistance does not have a
distorting effect on the labour market, which direct
employment subsidies for the ”less productive” of-
ten produce.
Denmark seems to be an exception also when it
comes to the use of partial disability benefits. De-
spite the variety of ways in which it is possible to
combine work and benefits, no significant overutil-
isation of the benefits has occurred. This is no doubt
explained to some extent by effective activation
policies, yet at the same time, such policies could
not have emerged out of a vacuum but have been
made possible by strong economic performance.
Activation of persons unemployed for health or la-
bour market reasons is typically successful or at least
provides a realistic alternative as long as there are
genuine employment opportunities.
An adequate level of provision without means
testing
Over the last 10 years, much effort has been expend-
ed in Finland on discovering and dismantling the
incentive traps related to minimum income secur-
ity. The measures that have been introduced have
both weakened and improved the economic circum-
stances of those relying on the minimum benefits.
However, it is difficult to see on the macro level that
these measures have significantly improved the
employment situation of persons with a weak la-
bour market position. In this case, too, a compar-
ison to the other Nordic countries provides a fresh
perspective. Disincentive problems can be prevent-
ed by an adequate level of provision, combined with
effective activation policies, and by a societal will to
take on as much of the responsibility as possible for
the social provision of those in the weakest labour
market position.
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5.4 Final remarks
The basic philosophy behind the Finnish income
security system has developed in the context of poli-
cies aimed at promoting productivity growth and
structural change in society. Its aim has been to pro-
vide support to individuals who, for one reason or
another, are temporarily or permanently outside
paid employment. A new philosophy is now nee-
ded, one that can better accommodate work and
social security to the benefit of ageing workers,
families, persons with functional limitations, and
others with a weak position in the labour market.
The benefit systems must also be restructured to
prevent marginalisation from work and discrimin-
ation in hiring and to offer flexible alternatives to
combine work and benefits in different circum-
stances and at different times of life.
Ideally, flexible combination of work and social se-
curity can produce a more equal distribution of
work between both different population groups and
different stages of life. If such flexible combination
arrangements are expanded to meet the needs that
workers may encounter in any stage of their work-
ing careers, solutions may be found to the problem
of increasing the employment rate at both ends of
the age scale. The aim should be to create an incent-
ive structure designed from the ground up to integ-
rate those in a weaker position into the ”normal”
labour market, to promote employment and to al-
low people to use the work capacity they have re-
maining. It is in this respect that Finland should
learn from the experiences of the other Nordic
countries, even if the practices they have adopted
may not be transferable as such to Finland.
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